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This thesis attempts a reading of Revenge Tragedy using concepts found in 
Psychoanalytic theory to explore the idea of identity formation. Revenge 
tragedy was a popular form of drama in the Jacobean period, although the 
first revenge play, The Spanish Tragedy was written before the end of the 
sixteenth century. Revenge tragedies feature an individual who takes private 
action for a crime committed against a loved one, usually because he/she is 
denied legitimate justice. This type of drama is said to reflect the anxieties of 
its age, one of which is the question of identity.
Identity is also a major concern of psychoanalytic theory, in which the self is 
not a stable or unified entity since the human subject is constituted through 
the representational dynamics of desire itself. According to Freud, the core 
of selfhood resides within the ego which mediates between the desires of the 
id and external reality. Lacan reformulates Freud's concept of the ego 
through identity formation which occurs through a series of identifications 
with objects of the external world.
Such concepts are examined, then tested against revenge tragedies where the 
revenger uses role play and identification to refashion the self so that 
vengeance can be obtained.
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One- Freud, Death and the Ego




Jacobean tragedy has been described by Lever (1971) as "the tragedy of state" while 
Dollimore (1984) introduced the term "radical tragedy" Among the reasons cited for 
these related descriptions of Jacobean tragedy is the evidence of the decentered subject 
(normally the protagonist) in these tragedies as well as the influence of external forces, 
especially the state, in the formation of selfhood. Dollimore (1984) contends: "Because 
informed by contradictory social and ideological processes, the subject [in these 
tragedies] is never an indivisible unity, never an autonomous, self-determining centre of 
consciousness" (p. 269). Instead, human consciousness is determined by social being (p. 
153). Revenge tragedy, which was popular during this period, enacts the degeneration of 
the revenger as he falls victim to injustice, and the resulting conflict which pitches the 
desires of the individual against a higher earthly power who offers no legitimate access to 
the fulfillment of these desires. Having no recourse to justice, the subject in these 
tragedies loses self-autonomy as a result of which he needs to refashion the self in order 
to achieve his desire for blood revenge.
The keynote of Jacobean tragedy was therefore its contrast between the state of outward 
seeming and the inner monarchy of man, which resisted tyranny in various ways (Lever, 
1971, p. 6). Contrary to the Aristotelian concept of tragedy however, Lever points out 
that the protagonists in Jacobean tragedy meet with their downfall not through an 
inherent flaw in character (hamartia or error of judgement) but because of the world they 
inhabit. While the circumstances confronting the respective revengers might command 
more attention for Lever than the individual character study, it has to be pointed out that 
to some extent, the circumstances in these plays are as they are because of the individual 
characters. We might speculate that the tragedy of Hamlet would have taken a different 
turn if the protagonist had been, say, Othello. By this I mean that if we were to transpose 
the character of Othello (as he is portrayed in the play Othello) and put him in the 
situation faced by Hamlet, where he is told by the ghost of his murdered father to 
"Revenge his foul and most unnatural murder" (Hamlet, I.V.25) and what's more, have 
the identity of his father's murderer disclosed to him at the same time, the Moor's warrior
spirit would never have allowed Claudius to live as long as he does in Hamlet. The basic 
premise of the revenge plot, by contrast, is generally similar by convention. Thus, a 
discussion of revenge tragedy which ignores the human dimension, while possible and 
definitely plausible, would nevertheless be somewhat selective and thereby limited in 
scope.
Brooks (1987) in arguing for a "psychoanalytical literary criticism" states that the 
traditional application of psychoanalysis to literary study has mistaken the object of 
analysis, focussing on the author, the reader or the fictive characters in the text. This 
misrecognition has resulted in interpretations of literary texts which essentially miss the 
point of psychoanalysis as a tool of literary criticism. He suggests that classical 
psychoanalytic criticism does not exploit the full potential of psychoanalytic theory as it 
simply displaces the object of analysis to some person (i.e. the author, reader or fictive 
character) without paying due attention to the primary source, which is the text itself 
(p.2). Brooks thus suggests that instead of trying to explain literary texts using 
psychoanalysis as a tool, the critic should view the relationship between literature and 
psychoanalysis as a negotiation between the two fields, an encounter which can prove 
mutually illuminating. This view had previously been expressed by Felman (1977): 
"What the literary critic might thus wish, is to initiate a real exchange, to engage in a real 
dialogue between literature and psychoanalysis, as between two different bodies of 
language and between two different modes of knowledge" (p. 6).
To expand on Felman5 s suggestion, Brooks argues that psychoanalytical criticism can 
and should be textual and rhetorical because the structure of literature is in some sense 
the structure of the mind, and as such, affords access to the way human desires really 
operate. He thus describes the relationship between human fiction-making and psychic 
processes as "convergent activities and superimposable forms of analysis" (p. 9). This 
evokes the psychoanalytical concept of transference to describe the encounter between 
reader and text, where the reader rethinks, reorders and interprets based on the discourse 
of the text. Laplanche and Pontalis (1983) define transference as "a process of 
actualisation of unconscious wishes" (p. 455). The text functions as the analyst whereby
it constructs a hypothetical piece of narrative which is communicated to the reader 
(analysand) so that it may work upon him. As in the psychoanalytic situation of 
transference, the reliving and reinterpretation of life's experiences through the "mastery 
of resistances and the lifting of repressions" which occurs via the working out of the text 
can help the reader to rephrase his perceptions and submit to the power of the text's 
conviction (Brooks, 1987, p. 12).
While Brooks' argument for a structural application of psychoanalysis to literature may 
help to illuminate our understanding of the working of the human mind, and offer some 
form of explanation for the attraction that fiction holds for us, it provides no explanation 
for the pleasurable effect of tragic drama on the spectator. It is assumed that Brooks does 
not take drama into account in this essay because the focus is on the structure of 
narrative. Nevertheless, as the notion of structure is not unique to narrative alone, 
Brooks' formulation can be and should be applied to drama as well. While 
acknowledging the correspondence between form in drama and the structure of mental 
life, we should not ignore the content of drama, which is essentially human experience 
reconstructed through characters onstage.
Freud, following Aristotle, points out that the purpose of drama is "a question of opening 
up sources of pleasure or enjoyment in our emotional life" by "the process of getting rid 
of one's own emotions" (Psychopathic Characters on the Stage, 1942, p. 121). The 
experience of being a spectator in a play is similar to the gratification that children 
achieve through play, an imitation of grown-up life. Witnessing a play, in other words, 
allows the spectator to identify himself with a character on the stage (usually the 
protagonist). Aristotle is said to have approved of the cathartic effect which tragedy can 
bring, as the experience of emotions such as pity and fear while watching a tragedy can 
discharge the tendency to experience such emotions in excess (Heath, 1996, pp. xxxv- 
xlii), which in turn leaves the emotion in a more balanced state. By relieving the mind of 
excessive emotion, catharsis (or katharsis) brings pleasure: and since catharsis is 
achieved through the witnessing of tragedy, then tragedy too must ultimately bring 
pleasure. This pleasure is achieved however, only after the spectator has suffered during
the course of witnessing the tragedy. The process is thus remarkably similar to the trade- 
off which Freud contends is made by the ego in surrendering to the reality principle: a 
momentary unpleasure is tolerated in order to gain an assured pleasure at a later time 
(Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning, 1911, p. 41). The medium 
through which the suffering is conveyed is of course, the dramatic character on the stage. 
Because of this negotiation between spectator and text as embodied in character, the 
application of psychoanalysis to drama must necessarily include a study of character if it 
is to be of any value.
In studying dramatic character one is led inevitably to notions of the self and identity, a 
major concern of psychoanalytic theory. Elliott (1994) summarises this concept using 
Freudian terminology: "In psychoanalytic terms, the self is not a stable or unified entity. 
Rather, the human subject is constituted to its roots through the representational 
dynamics of desire itself ... we cannot really speak of the self outside desire, fantasy, 
sexuality, and ... identification ..." (p. 2). Freudian theory posits three agencies within 
the structure of the mind: the id, which is made up of purely unconscious instinctual 
drives, the ego which is the organized realistic part, and the super-ego which is 
essentially the conscience. The ego, as mediator between the desires of the id and 
external reality represents the core of the formation of selfhood within the individual, as 
the self can only come into being by differentiating itself in relation to an other. Identity 
thus has to be created by the individual (Elliott, 1994, p. 13). Lacan later re-reads Freud's 
theories of the ego and attempts a reformulation of the concept of the ego via identity 
formation "Because the ego is formed from the outside world, individuals depend on 
one another for "self validation throughout life ... This means that no person's ego is 
ever whole or autonomous" (Ragland, 1995, p. 19). Individual subjectivity according to 
Lacan depends on external reality, specifically as defined in the order of language. The 
ego is formed primarily through a series of identifications with the objects of the external 
world because it (the ego) lacks innate being.
Since Lacan's concept of identity formation was made possible by his reformulation of 
Freud's controversial theory of the death drive, this same theory will serve as a starting
point for this project's inquiry into revenge tragedy, psychoanalytic theory and identity. 
Dollimore (1996) states, "[The] perceived links between death, desire, and language 
connect revealingly with what, in modern theory, is variously called the subversion, the 
death, or the decentering of the subject" (p. 369). Drama of the Jacobean period reflects a 
poverty of spirit, a mood of spiritual despair and a preoccupation with violence and death. 
Freud records a similar movement in his thinking, beginning from the essay Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle (1920). Where his earlier writings were concerned with the conflict 
between the sexual instincts and the ego-instincts, the later phase pitted the life instincts 
(Eros) against the death drive (Thanatos) in the attempt to account for human mental 
processes in the face of external pressures. Three centuries before Freud, Jacobean 
dramatists had explored similar concerns. The term "Jacobean" in this project does not 
correspond to the accession of the monarch James I, as I will be looking at two plays 
which were written before 1603; rather, the use of the term here refers to that theatrical 
style and temper which evokes "cynical disillusionment commonly associated with the 
epithet 'Jacobean'..." (Salgado, 1980, p. 85). Such a mood was apparent in plays like The 
Spanish Tragedy, Hamlet and Antonio's Revenge, all of which had already been 
performed before the sixteenth century closed. Thus, as Salgado notes, this darker mood 
of the drama belongs as much to the later 1590s as to the Jacobean era proper. A reading 
of revenge tragedy in the light of psychoanalytical formulations which posit a primordial 
death drive in man might therefore provide some insight into the manner of conflict faced 
by Jacobean man as communicated through the drama of the period. At the same time, it 
is hoped that re-reading Freud in the light of revenge tragedy will disclose the extent to 
which psychoanalytical theory may plausibly be applied to literary texts without 
speculating at the socio-historical factors surrounding the composition of these plays. As 
such, this hopes to be as much a reading of psychoanalytical theory in the light of 
revenge tragedy as a reading of revenge tragedy in the light of psychoanalytical theory.
The main concern of this project will be to examine the concept of identity-formation as 
implied in the character of the revenge figure. An attempt will be made to follow the 
creation of the subject in Freudian (and Lacanian) psychoanalysis to compare it with the 
representation of the subject in revenge tragedy, as there appears to be a parallel between
the two. The idea which links them is the fact that in both psychoanalysis and revenge 
tragedy the notion of the unified subject is an illusion: the subject does not exist as an 
autonomous entity in either. Formed through a series of identifications and 
misrecognitions, the subject does not possess a stable identity. A tentative analogy will be 
drawn between the formation of the subject (the ego) with the experience of the revenger 
in Jacobean revenge tragedy. The revengers are not essentially murderers or villains to 
whom evil is second nature. However, they are unable to obtain justice for a wrong 
committed upon a loved one, and this effectively forces them to take the law into their 
own hands. Using the analogy of ego formation I will attempt to trace the metamorphosis 
of the character of the revenger who uses madness, disguise and role-playing to recreate 
identity. To examine this issue, the revengers will be perceived as characters in their own 
right. However, following Lever's suggestion, attention will be paid mainly to the quality 
of their responses to their respective situations, not as a means of drawing moral 
conclusions but as a study in human behaviour. Three revenge plays will be examined: 
The Spanish Tragedy, Antonio's Revenge and The Revenger's Tragedy.
CHAPTER ONE 
FREUD, DEATH AND THE EGO
In Freud's Masterplot Peter Brooks (1977) ties Freud's speculations in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle (1920) to the structure of narrative plot. He quotes Barthes who argued 
in S Z that "the passion that animates us as readers of narrative is the passion for (of) 
meaning" where "meaning [for Barthes] resides in full predication, completion of the codes 
in a "plenitude" of signification" and as such, "this passion appears to be finally a desire for 
the end" for "[i]t is at the end ... that recognition brings its illumination" (p. 282). For 
Brooks therefore, "[t]he sense of beginning ... is determined by the sense of an ending." He 
then links this with "the human end" : "All narration is obituary in that life acquires 
definable meaning only at, and through, death." Death here need not necessarily be 
confined to its biological sense, for the very act of expressing something in language 
implies its absence, its death: "the symbol manifests itself first of all as the murder of the 
thing." Catherine Belsey (1994) explains that "[l]anguage erases even as it creates. The 
signifier replaces the object it identifies as a separate entity; the linguistic symbol supplants 
what it names and differentiates, relegates it to a limbo beyond language where it becomes 
inaccessible, lost ..." (p. 55). From his reading of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Brooks 
points out that Freud's discovery of the primacy of the act of repetition can also be applied 
to narration in that "[n]arrative always makes the implicit claim to be in a state of 
repetition, as a going over again of a ground already covered ..." Repetition is also 
constantly present in our experience of literary texts: "rhyme, alliteration, assonance, meter, 
refrain, all the mnemonic elements of fictions ... are in some manner repetitions which take 
us back in the text ..." (1977, p. 289). Linking devices such as ellipsis perform a similar 
function. Although drama differs from narrative fiction in that the action is played out 
before an audience rather than narrated (as in a novel or short story), there still exists the 
element of narrative in most drama, the recounting of events or feelings of the characters, 
and hence the act of repetition. The added value of drama is that this repetition can be 
witnessed or detected not only in the words of the characters but also in their actions.
How does the repetition compulsion tie in with the death drive (or instinct) in narration? 
Freud defined the term instinct as "an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier 
state of things" (quoted in Brooks, 1977, p. 290). The truth in this statement can be 
witnessed even in ordinary, every day life where routine appears to be a prerequisite for the
stable existence of most humans. Given the inevitability of death as the end of all life, what 
is the purpose of all routine, all efforts to "get on with life", if not death? Storr (1968) 
however, disagrees with Freud's hypothesis of the death drive by contending that the 
aggressive drive (which is a manifestation of the death drive, according to Freud) performs 
a biological function in terms of the preservation of the individual and of the human 
species, and therefore, cannot be viewed as self-destructive. At the risk of appearing to 
argue in circles it must nevertheless be pointed out that paradoxically, since death is the 
one thing in life that we can be sure of, everything we do and hence certainly all our self- 
preservative instincts ultimately "function to ensure that the organism shall follow its own 
path to death" Hence, "the aim of all life is death" Brooks (1977) ties this in with the 
narrative text by stating that "[w]hat operates in the text through repetition is the death 
instinct, the drive toward the end", literally, the end of the story. For "the desire of the text 
(the desire of reading) is ... desire for the end ..." (p. 292). When we read fiction we want 
to know what happens at the end. Similarly, in drama, an audience wants to know what 
happens to the protagonist at the end of the play. A.D. Nuttall, in his essay Why Does 
Tragedy Give Pleasure? (1996) states that tragedy leads always to a conclusion: "Of all the 
literary genres tragedy is the one which lays the heaviest emphasis on ending, and the 
ending is a mimesis of a death. In so far as we sympathise, we experience the dying but of 
course we do not die" (p. 78). This provides a first clue as to the link between tragedy and 
death, and the audience's negotiation of the two: it is a process of identifying with the 
portrayal onstage.
Before embarking upon an examination of the workings of the death drive (demonstrated in 
the form of repetition compulsion) in narration, specifically in dramatic action, it would be 
useful to summarise the main points in Freud's essay Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) 
where he first introduces the concept of the death drive. In this essay Freud recaps what he 
believed to be the role of the pleasure principle in regulating mental activity. He believed 
that the main function of mental activity was the lowering of unpleasurable tension: "In the 
theory of psychoanalysis we have no hesitation in assuming that the course taken by mental 
events is automatically regulated by the pleasure principle. We believe ... that the course of 
those events is invariably set in motion by an unpleasurable tension, and that it takes a 
direction such that its final outcome coincides with a lowering of that tension - that is, with 
an avoidance of unpleasure or a production of pleasure" (p. 275). Feelings of pleasure and 
unpleasure were related to the quantity of excitation in the mind, whereby unpleasure
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corresponded to an increase in the quantity of excitation while pleasure resulted from its 
diminution. The aim of the mental apparatus, therefore, according to Freud, was to keep the 
quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible or at least, to keep it constant - this 
constituted the pleasure principle (which followed from the constancy or 'Nirvana' 
principle). He conceded, nevertheless, that it would be incorrect to assume the dominance 
of the pleasure principle over the course of all mental processes for if such a dominance 
existed, the majority of our mental processes would be pleasurable, whereas universal 
experience contradicts such a conclusion: "The most that can be said ... is that there exists 
in the mind a strong tendency towards the pleasure principle, but that that tendency is 
opposed by certain other forces or circumstances so that the final outcome cannot always 
be in harmony with the tendency towards pleasure" (p. 278, Freud's emphasis). He then 
went on to provide an example of the inhibition of the pleasure principle in daily life, 
namely the force of the reality principle, which is essentially the curbing of primary 
instincts to conform to external conditions, under the ego's quest for self-preservation. The 
reality principle is effected by, among other methods, the postponement of satisfaction and 
the temporary toleration of unpleasure. However, Freud was not satisfied that this reality 
principle alone was responsible for all the experiences of unpleasure faced by any 
individual. He found that victims of traumatic neurosis had recurring dreams where they 
were repeatedly brought back into the accidents which had caused the trauma. The 
traumatised mind, in other words, was fixated to its trauma, thus constantly subjecting itself 
to unpleasure. Similar findings were recorded with respect to victims of war neuroses. Such 
clinical evidence contradicted Freud's initial hypothesis of the wish-fulfilling function, and 
by extension, pleasure seeking role played by dreams.
The next piece of evidence Freud evoked which appeared to contradict the pleasure 
principle was the fort-da game he observed in his little grandson. Here, the boy was seen to 
derive satisfaction from throwing a wooden reel (which had a piece of string tied to it) into 
his cot then pulling it out of the cot again so that it would reappear. Freud interpreted this 
game as the staging of the disappearance (and reappearance) of the boy's mother, and his 
attempt at mastering that situation. Nevertheless, he wondered how this repetition of a 
distressing experience as a game could fit in with the pleasure principle. He could only 
conclude that there must be another instinct which influenced mental activity, an instinct 
more primeval than, and independent of, the pleasure principle. This instinct was 
characterised, Freud found, by a compulsion to repeat which overrides the pleasure
principle in that what was repeated was not always a source of pleasure. Freud thus 
combined the notion of instinct with the compulsion to repeat and came up with "... a 
universal attribute of instincts and perhaps of organic life in general ... [namely] that an 
instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the 
living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; 
that is, it is ... the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life" (p. 308, Freud's 
emphasis). Based on this idea of the conservative nature of organic instincts, the aim of the 
living entity must therefore be, by following through Freud's logic, to return to an initial 
state i.e. become inorganic once again since " ... "inanimate things existed before living 
ones'" (p. 311, Freud's emphasis). Thus Freud was "... compelled to say that "the aim of all 
life is death'..." (ibid.). Once the entity has achieved its aim (death), there would of course 
be no possibility for excessive excitation to threaten the equilibrium of the mental 
apparatus. Death therefore, was the ultimate condition which would ensure that the mental 
apparatus was maintained in a condition of minimal tension; hence, to Freud, this was the 
Nirvana towards which all living organisms must surely aspire. Bearing in mind that Freud 
linked pleasure to the diminution of excitation within the mental apparatus, this proposed 
universal aim of instincts would indeed appear to comply with the pleasure principle. The 
conclusion which can be drawn from all this is that the death instinct, which strives to keep 
the quantity of excitation within the mind at a minimal level, serves to uphold the pleasure 
principle. However, Freud states this conclusion in the reverse. At the end of the essay, we 
are told that "[t]he pleasure principle seems actually to serve the death instincts" (p. 338). 
This shows that to Freud, the death instinct is more primordial than the pleasure principle; 
this is reflected in the title of the essay, which locates in the death drive something beyond 
the pleasure principle, something perhaps even independent of the obtaining of pleasure (in 
Freud's sense of the word), something which cannot be explained away by the pleasure 
principle. However, as will be shown, the pleasure principle and the death drive are 
actually closely linked, for in keeping with Freud's logic, it would appear that in achieving 
pleasure (again, as Freud defined it) the mental apparatus actually serves the death instinct.
In considering the relationship between the death drive and fiction it is useful to bear in 
mind a little reminder Freud provides which links his speculations on the nature of 
children's play with the repetition compulsion. In his discussion of the fort-da game, one of 
the explanations suggested for the behaviour of the boy was that this game was the 
repetition of an unpleasurable experience (the child being left by his mother) as an attempt
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at mastering the situation and as such, this would yield some form of pleasure (enjoyment). 
Borch-Jacobsen (1989) in contrast, sets aside the notion of pleasure and suggests instead 
that the repetition phenomena "stem from mimesis, from the ambivalence of the 
identification with the other, and, especially, from the reversibility of that identification" 
(p. 32, his emphasis). This conclusion however, can only be arrived at " ... once we 
recognise that desire is not governed above all by the obtaining of pleasure, but by an 
identificatory model." This is because mimesis, says Borch-Jacobsen, has no goal of its 
own and as such, is indifferent with respect to pleasure and unpleasure - hence it lies 
"beyond" the pleasure principle. According to this view therefore, the child who throws the 
wooden reel so that it disappears over the edge of his cot is actually identifying with his 
mother and "...treating [his toys] the way his mother treats him" i.e. leaving him. The child 
is thus "playing at being his mother, and in so doing, identifying with her; he loses himself 
in the very gesture through which he is attempting to constitute himself as a proper subject, 
an autonomous ... subject" (p. 33). Freud interpreted \\\Q fort-da game as an active attempt 
on the part of the child at mastering the (unpleasant) situation: "... by desiring to repeat the 
painful experience, he would not suffer or be subjected to it [the pain of the experience]" 
(ibid., emphasis added) -and since this painful experience is willed upon himself by the 
child, it serves his own purpose, which lies beyond the simple attainment of pleasure. A 
link is thus established between the manifestation of the death drive, i.e. the repetition 
compulsion, with the formation of identity, which lies beyond the pleasure principle.
Similarly, in artistic imitation such as tragedy the audience derives enjoyment from the 
aesthetic mastery of painful experiences of loss re-enacted for them onstage (Ellman, 1994, 
p. 7). The desire for the end in tragedy is not only the desire for denouement but also for 
catharsis. Nuttall (1996) explores the Aristotelian concept of catharsis in an attempt to 
account for the element of pleasure derived by the spectator of tragic drama. He argues for 
what he terms the 'medical' interpretation of catharsis i.e. 'purgation' He claims that to 
Aristotle, it is the purgation of emotions, such as pity or fear, which brings pleasure to the 
spectator. The emotions, in other words, "... are, precisely, the impurity which is removed" 
(p. 6). This is necessary for the well-being of the person, for " ... as the body seeks to ease 
its load of waste matter, so the soul... seeks to ease its burden of emotion" (p. 36). He also 
stresses that in Aristotle's scheme of things it is the feelings of the audience which are 
aroused and purged by the action of tragedy, not those of the characters A precondition, 
however, is that the suffering represented onstage must be known to be just that: "...
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however mirror-like [the] scheme of representation, the representative sign must be 
distinguishable, as having a sign-like character, from the thing it signifies ..." (p. 17). In 
this way, according to NuttaU's interpretation of Aristotle's Poetics, the poet imitates the 
real world, but does so in the hypothetical mode: the sequence of events must be probable 
rather than actual to enable "the delight of tragedy" as Samuel Johnson termed it, for if the 
spectator thought that say, a man was really being stabbed to death onstage, it is somewhat 
unlikely that he/she could actually derive pleasure from being a witness to such brutality. 
To quote Dr Johnson: "[t]he delight of tragedy proceeds from our consciousness of fiction; 
if we thought murders and treasons real, they would please no more" (quoted in Nuttall, p. 
17). The function of tragic drama is thus to activate the emotions (through a fictional or 
hypothetical situation) to enable them to be discharged while tragic pleasure "... consists ... 
in a psychic discharge ..." (p. 39, emphasis added). If we accept Freud's contention in 
Psychopathic Characters on the Stage (1905-6) that drama, of which the subject matter is 
suffering, allows the spectator to derive some form of pleasure through identifying 
himself/herself with the hero, then it follows that it is mainly self-inflicted suffering (since 
there is no external compulsion to witness the play) which gives the audience pleasure. 
This suffering, which manifests itself in various forms such as fear, anxiety or sorrow 
would, to use Freud's language of psychic energetics, increase the quantity of excitation 
within the psychical system. Drawing on Freud's argument for his theory of the death drive 
(the compulsion to repeat/replay in the mind unpleasurable experiences which he viewed as 
evidence of a masochistic tendency on the part of the ego) can we view the enjoyment of 
drama, particularly tragedy, as a form of manifestation of the death drive, at least on the 
part of the play-goer?
In an attempt to follow the progress of Freud's theorising on the nature of instincts, of 
which his formulations in the essay Beyond the Pleasure Principle marked a turning point, 
it is necessary to outline briefly, from his earlier writing, his speculations on the nature of 
mental functioning in which he attempted to explain the nature of both the normal as well 
as neurotic psyche. Bearing in mind Freud's aim in positing the opposition between the 
death drive and the life instincts, which is ultimately to account for the (conflict in the) 
human psyche which results in neurosis, this study of Freud's writing will have two aims, 
namely to attempt a reading of the theory of the death drive, as well as to locate the 
function of the ego within this scheme of things since it has been described as the defensive 
pole of the personality in neurotic conflict: " ... it [the ego] brings a set of defensive
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mechanisms into play which are motivated by the perception of an unpleasurable affect..." 
(Laplanche and Pontalis, 1983, p. 130). If there is truth in Brooks' contention that the 
structure of literature mirrors the structure of the mind then it would appear that tragedy 
essentially reflects man's (innate?) desire for suffering and death.
Since Freud titled his essay Beyond the Pleasure Principle, it might be helpful to begin the 
study by considering the concept of the pleasure principle. Laplanche and Pontalis (1983) 
give the following definition : "One of the two principles which, according to Freud, 
govern mental functioning: the whole of psychical activity is aimed at avoiding unpleasure 
and procuring pleasure" (p. 322). The next question would thus be, what is the significance 
of the pleasure principle in regulating mental functioning? The essay Formulations on the 
Two Principles of Mental Functioning (1911) explores the distinction between the 
regulating principles (the pleasure principle and the reality principle) which affect mental 
processes. Having defined the pleasure principle, the concept of the reality principle, too, 
needs a definition. "One of the two principles which for Freud govern mental functioning. 
The reality principle is coupled with the pleasure principle, which it modifies: in so far as it 
succeeds in establishing its dominance as a regulatory principle, the search for satisfaction 
does not take the most direct routes but instead makes detours and postpones the attainment 
of its goal according to the conditions imposed by the outside world" (Laplanche and 
Pontalis, p. 379). In the essay mentioned above, Freud (1911) acknowledges the 
significance of the external world on the mental state of the individual, as observed in cases 
of neurosis "... every neurosis has as its result, and probably therefore as its purpose, a 
forcing of the patient out of real life, an alienating of him from reality. ... Neurotics turn 
away from reality because they find it unbearable ..." (p. 35).
To understand mental functioning, psychoanalysis takes unconscious mental processes to 
be the older, primary processes which are " ... the residues of a phase of development in 
which they were the only kind of mental process" [in childhood] (p. 36). The point to be 
noted about these primary mental processes is that they are governed by the pleasure 
principle in that they strive towards gaining pleasure while drawing back from any event 
which might arouse unpleasure - and it is in the course of these mental processes that 
repression is introduced, which functions to enable the mind to avoid eventual unpleasure. 
It would appear that repression occurs in the development of the subject at a very early 
stage - although the repression referred to here would appear to be concerned mainly with
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the sexual instincts. In Freud's scheme of things, the term "sexuality" is not to be confined 
to one particular field, namely genital sexuality. Brown (1959) using Freud's theories on 
infantile sexual development argues that "... the pattern of normal adult sexuality is not a 
natural (biological) necessity but a cultural phenomenon" (p. 24) devised for propagating 
the species, while Freud, by contrast, intends a more general definition of the sexual 
instinct: "... the energy or desire with which the human being pursues pleasure, with the 
further specification that the pleasure sought is the pleasurable activity of an organ of the 
human body" (p. 26) - any organ of the human body. As the child matures and conforms to 
culture and civilisation, which narrow the field of sexuality to the function of reproduction, 
however, he has to repress this (wide encompassing form of) sexuality, pushing it into the 
unconscious. This is why Freud posits in his theory of psychoanalysis that dreams and 
neurotic symptoms are evidence of the adult's repressed sexuality; besides that, his theory 
implies that the notion of (adult) sexual perversion is really an indication of the repressive 
influence of social forces.
Brown (1959) recaps the Freudian notion of infantile sexuality as "... nothing more or less 
than delight in the active life of all the human body" (p. 30) - a view similar to the one held 
by the poets of the Romantic period. His theory of infantile sexuality is thus "... essentially 
a scientific reformulation and reaffirmation of the religious and poetical theme of the 
innocence of childhood" (p. 32). Freud's theory has at its core a biological basis in that it 
takes into consideration the prolongation of infancy in the human species, which enables 
infantile sexuality (in his sense of the term) to achieve a full bloom before the onset of 
puberty and the consequent narrowing of sexuality to its genital function. This is why there 
is a conflict in the sexual life of man "In man infantile sexuality is repressed and never 
outgrown ..." (ibid., p. 28). Thus to Freud, "the theory of repression is the corner-stone on 
which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests" (quoted in the Editor's Note to 
Repression, 19156, p. 141). The biological, inevitably, encroaches on the psychological. 
With the process of maturation the child's psychical apparatus is denied the constant 
satisfaction and pleasure it seeks. He/she needs to negotiate the real circumstances in the 
external world and endeavour to make real alterations in them (Formulations on the Two 
Principles of Mental Functioning, 1911, p. 36). This necessitates the introduction of reality 
to the mind (the setting up of the reality principle), even if it happens to be disagreeable. It 
is here that Freud introduces the notion of the ego. Laplanche (1976) summarises three 
perspectives from which the ego can be defined as "the special prolongation of the
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individual" (p. 51) : in terms of its genesis, its situation in neurotic and psychotic conflict 
(the dynamic perspective) and in terms of the energy disposed of in the midst of conflict.
The ego is said to emerge when the individual comes into contact with the external world. 
In Part IV of Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud suggests a model of the ego where a 
portion of the mental apparatus, upon the impact of shocks corning from the external world, 
is differentiated and forms a kind of perceptual and protective envelope. Reality is seen to 
exert some kind of force which compels the ego to act upon the instinctual drives of the id 
and endeavour "to substitute the reality principle for the pleasure principle which reigns 
supreme in the id" (quoted in Laplanche, p. 53). With the advent of the reality principle, 
the sensory organs take on a more active role in bringing to the attention of consciousness 
other qualities aside from pleasure available in the external world. With this development, 
motor discharge is converted into action in the bid to alter reality; at the same time, 
thinking is pressed into service as "an experimental kind of acting" (Freud, 1911, p. 38). It 
appears that the ego is somehow plugged directly into reality by virtue of what Freud terms 
the Perception-Consciousness System and the sensory organs. This enables the ego to carry 
out "a testing of reality", which Laplanche explains as "correcting the distortion imposed 
on reality by our desires" This correction is achieved by disposing of an amount of energy 
contained in the drives of the id, which is why Laplanche conceives of the ego as "a 
transmitter of the id's "vital" energy, which it purifies, dominates, and channels as best it 
can". It would appear that reality is the main factor which causes the mind to think. Freud 
remarks that "[i]t is probable that thinking was originally unconscious, in so far as it went 
beyond mere ideational presentations and was directed to the relations between impressions 
of objects, and that it did not acquire further qualities, perceptible to consciousness, until it 
became bound to verbal residues." (Freud, 1911, p. 39, emphasis added). Clearly, Freud 
acknowledges the role of language in representing to the conscious mind thoughts which 
originate from impressions of objects gathered through the sensory organs. The question 
thus arises as to the nature of the material which is repressed (the id's "vital" energy which 
is converted by the ego) - that is, whether it remains in the form of sensory impressions, or 
whether it is converted through the medium of language into thoughts then repressed 
because it does not fit in with the reality principle. In other words, is repression a conscious 
mental process (since thoughts have to be verbalised in order to be brought to the attention 
of consciousness)?
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In a later essay, Repression (19156), we find that the concept of repression is to be applied 
to the instinctual impulses. Freud had earlier described the nature of 'instincts' in Instincts 
and their Vicissitudes (1915a) as originating in sources of stimulation within the organism 
itself, and appearing in the form of a constant force. 'Instinctual stimulus' is thus better 
described as 'need', which can only be appeased by satisfaction. To Freud, instinctual 
stimuli contribute a great deal to the development of the nervous system which in rum, 
cause the individual "... to undertake involved and interconnected activities by which the 
external world is so changed as to afford satisfaction to the internal source of stimulation" 
(1915a, p. 116). This is because the nervous system functions to rid itself of the stimuli, or 
reduce them to the lowest possible levels. As usual, Freud is still concerned with 
maintaining the primacy of the pleasure principle in regulating mental functioning. He 
claims that unpleasurable feelings are connected with an increase in stimulus while 
pleasurable feelings correspond to a decrease. Thus, he concludes that "[t]he aim of an 
instinct is in every instance satisfaction, which can only be obtained by removing the state 
of stimulation at the source of the instinct" (ibid., p. 119). Repression comes into the 
picture when the satisfaction of an instinctive impulse, and therefore, the achievement of 
pleasure, would be possible but irreconcilable with other claims and intentions, thus 
causing pleasure in one place but unpleasure in another (19156, p. 146). A condition for 
repression therefore is that the threat of unpleasure far outweighs the pleasure obtainable 
from the satisfaction of the instinctual impulse. Thus, the essence of repression lies simply 
in turning something away, and keeping it at a distance from the conscious (ibid., p. 147, 
Freud's emphasis). It would appear at first glance, that the act of repression cannot involve 
consciousness, since the instinctual impulse which is repressed within the ego has to be 
prevented from reaching the conscious mind. Hence, "... repression does not hinder the 
instinctual representative from continuing to exist in the unconscious ... Repression in fact 
interferes only with the relation of the instinctual representative to one psychical system, 
namely, to that of the conscious" (ibid., p. 148). Can we thus take it one step further and 
equate the unconscious with the repressed?
To answer this, we need to look at Freud's more exhaustive formulation on the nature of 
the unconscious - The Unconscious (1915c). Freud states again that "... thought processes, 
i.e. those acts of cathexis which are comparatively remote from perception, are in 
themselves without quality and unconscious, and ... they attain their capacity to become 
conscious only through being linked with the residues of perception of words ... [B]y
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being linked with words, cathexes can be provided with quality even when they represent 
only relations between presentations of objects and are thus unable to derive any quality 
from perceptions" (1915c, p. 208). Here again, Freud states that language is the means by 
which what goes on in the unconscious is represented in consciousness. The term 'cathexis' 
is ubiquitous in Freud's writing, and Laplanche and Pontalis have pointed out that "[t]he 
notion of cathexis ... plays a part in Freud's conceptual apparatus without his ever having 
given a rigorous theoretical definition of it" (1983, p. 63). Thus, "[t]he concept is generally 
taken in a metaphorical sense,... [to] express an analogy between psychical operations and 
the working of a nervous apparatus conceived of in terms of energy" (ibid.). Presumably 
the "quality" to which Freud alludes in the sections quoted above denotes a positive load of 
energy invested in the objects represented in the thought processes. More important than 
that, it is language ("words") which enables thoughts to be represented in consciousness. In 
his theory of the unconscious, Freud reiterates that the essence of repression lies not in 
annihilating the idea which represents an instinct, but in preventing it from becoming 
conscious. He also points out that the repressed does not cover everything that is 
unconscious although the repressed is a part of the unconscious (1915c, p. 167, emphasis 
added). In order to recover the unconscious, its contents have to be transformed or 
translated into something conscious, or something accessible to the conscious mind, such 
as dreams. The significance of the reality principle to mental functioning thus, is that with 
its introduction, one "species" of thought activity is split off and remains subordinated to 
the pleasure principle alone i.e. the activity of "phantasying" and "day-dreaming" which 
does not depend on reality.
Returning to the question of the unconscious and the repressed, Freud states later in the 
lecture "The Dissection of the Psychical Personality" in his New Introductory Lectures on 
Psychoanalysis (1933) that "... large portions of the ego and the super-ego can remain 
unconscious and are normally unconscious [:] ... the individual knows nothing of their 
contents ... It is a fact that ego and conscious, repressed and unconscious do not coincide" 
(p. 102). Freud then goes on to differentiate between the permanently unconscious with a 
psychical process which is unconscious but can easily become conscious again, which he 
terms "preconscious" The mind is thus divided into the "conscious", "preconscious" and 
"unconscious" With this formulation, the notion of being "unconscious" is no longer 
restricted by Freud to denote a quality, a state of mind but now encompasses the 
topographical as well : "[we] have used the word more and more to denote a mental
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province rather than a quality of what is mental" (p. 104). Since there were portions of the 
ego and super-ego which remain unconscious, Freud thus needed a different term to 
designate the permanent unconscious, the province of the mind which is "... alien to the 
ego" (ibid.) and settled for the term "id" He then describes the nature of the id : "... the 
dark, inaccessible part of our personality; ... open at its end to somatic influences ... [and 
hence] filled with energy reaching it from the instincts, but it has no organisation,... only a 
striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the observance of 
the pleasure principle" (p. 106). What then is the repressed and where does it fit into in this 
scheme of things? To answer this it is necessary to bring the ego into the picture. Freud 
describes the ego as "... that portion of the id which was modified by the proximity and 
influence of the external world, which is adapted for the reception of stimuli and as a 
protective shield against stimuli ..." (p. 108). The ego thus, functions to regulate and 
control the instinctual needs, which collect in the id. This is achieved by the act of thinking 
: "The ego controls the approach to motility under the id's orders; but between a need and 
an action it has interposed a postponement in the form of the activity of thought..." (ibid.). 
This is why Freud summarises the difference between the ego and the id as follows "... 
we might say that the ego stands for reason and good sense while the id stands for the 
untamed passions" (p. 109). In bringing reality to bear on the id, the ego often represses the 
unbound instinctual needs of the id and these merge into the remainder of the id, which is 
why the repressed remains unconscious.
Laplanche (1976) points out that Freud's classification of instincts demonstrates an 
inherent propensity for dualism, for his theory is based on conflict, and conflict involves 
duality : something is always opposed to the basic instinct, which to Freud, is sexuality. 
Brown (1959) similarly, states that "[t]he dynamic relation between the unconscious and 
the conscious life is one of conflict, and psychoanalysis is ... a science of mental conflict" 
(p. 4). He reiterates the importance of the Freudian notion of repression in understanding 
the unconscious: "Repression is the key word in the whole system; the word is chosen to 
indicate a structure dynamically based on psychic conflict" (p. 5). Following Freud, he 
sums up the notion of psychic conflict as follows "The pleasure-principle is in conflict 
with the reality-principle, and this conflict is the cause of repression" (p. 8). Our wishes 
and desires aim ultimately to procure pleasure; however, if they do not conform to external 
factors such as the demands of civilisation and culture they are repressed by the mind - and 
this, in Freud's view, can lead to neurosis. At the early stages of Freud's theorising the
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sexual instincts are opposed by the ego-instincts. With the onset of the reality principle in 
the child, one of the two sets of instincts must necessarily come under its sway. Since at the 
early stages of the individual's development the sexual instincts (or instincts for sensuality) 
behave auto-erotically, i.e. obtaining satisfaction from the subject's own body, thereby 
fulfilling the pleasure principle, this can only mean that it is the ego-instincts which attach 
themselves to the reality principle. Before proceeding further, the term auto-erotism needs 
to be clarified at this point. As Laplanche (1976) explains, Freud defined the term as "a 
sexual activity ... not directed towards other people" (p. 18). The implication would be that 
satisfaction is obtained in the absence of an object i.e. the baby obtains satisfaction from 
the act of sucking and not from the breast (or bottle, as the case may be). This obtaining of 
satisfaction for a need (nutrition), is for Freud, the origin of the sexual instinct. According 
to Laplanche however, auto-erotism is not the initial condition of sexuality: rather, it occurs 
as a second stage, at the point of the loss of the object, which is actually a displacement i.e. 
the breast (or the bottle), the source of the actual object which satisfies (milk). This second 
stage also marks the introduction of desire for the lost object. Thus Freud states in the third 
essay in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905, quoted in Laplanche, p. 19):
At a time at which the first beginnings of sexual satisfaction are still linked with the 
taking of nourishment, the sexual instinct has a sexual object outside the infant's own 
body in the shape of his mother's breast. It is only later that he loses it, just at the time, 
perhaps, when he is able to form a total idea of the person to whom the organ that is 
giving him satisfaction belongs. ... [T]he sexual drive then becomes auto-erotic, and 
not until the period of latency has been passed through is the original relation restored. 
The finding of an object is in fact a re-finding of it.
Freud's last point is clarified by Laplanche (p. 20, his emphasis) as follows:
...[t]he sexual object is not identical to the object of the function [the need for 
nutrition], but is displaced in relation to it; they are of essential contiguity which leads 
us to slide almost indifferently from one to the other, from the milk to the breast as its 
symbol... [thus] the object to be rediscovered is not the lost object but its substitute by 
displacement; ... [this gives rise to] the impossibility of ultimately ever rediscovering 
the object since the object which has been lost is not the same as that which is to be 
discovered.
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If sexuality represents the model of every drive, any drive which is opposed to it must 
ultimately, be modelled upon this same drive, yet act in opposition, leading to psychical 
conflict. In his later formulation of the death drive, Freud will be led to hypothesise the 
primacy of self-aggression over what Laplanche terms heteroaggression, aggression 
directed towards another. However, if we bear in mind the fact that auto-erotism is not the 
initial or primary state of sexuality, then by analogy, we must conclude that self- 
aggression, as an expression of the death drive can only gain precedence in the psyche in 
the absence of an object against which aggression may be directed. At the same time, if the 
object of the sexual drive is based on a form of misrecognition as pointed out above, does 
this imply that a similar misdirection occurs with respect to the death drive? In which case, 
the instinct for aggression (as manifestation of the death drive) is directed against some 
external object, but because its aim is not allowed to be carried through (by a combination 
of external and internal forces - the consequence of reality) it turns against itself (in a non- 
sexual form of auto-erotism) as displacement. If this is the case for one instance of the 
manifestation of the death drive, then it must also work for the other representatives of the 
death drive which are essentially, centred around the compulsion to repeat (Ricoeur, 1970, 
p. 281).
To return to the opposition between the pleasure principle and the reality principle: Freud 
was reluctant at this early stage to renounce completely the importance of the pleasure 
principle, suggesting instead that the reality principle makes its appearance ultimately in 
the subject's bid at self-preservation: "...the substitution of the reality principle for the 
pleasure principle implies no deposing of the pleasure principle, but only a safeguarding of 
it. A momentary pleasure ... is given up ... only in order to gain along the new path an 
assured pleasure at a later time" (Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental 
Functioning, 1911, p. 41). The ego-instincts are linked to conscious activities which 
negotiate reality: the ego is transformed from a pleasure-ego into a reality-ego while the 
sexual instincts remain initially under the dominance of the pleasure principle (through 
phantasy) and later undergo changes "... which lead them from their original auto- 
eroticism through various intermediate phases to object-love in the service of procreation" 
(ibid., p. 42). The surrender of pleasure therefore, appears to Freud to be a kind of decoy. 
Elliott (1994, p. 13) suggests that the unconscious (sexual) drives only defer immediate 
satisfaction in order achieve a more durable type of pleasure which is attained through the 
imaginary contours of selfhood. As such, "[pleasure is not... defeated; it merely takes new
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forms, via the imaginary tribulations of identity" (ibid.). By assigning the negotiation of 
reality to the ego, which transforms it into a reality-ego from a pleasure-ego, then 
suggesting that the ego's surrender to the reality principle is in effect simply a ministration 
to the pleasure principle in disguise, Freud transfers the psychical workings from the 
unconscious mental processes onto the (conscious) ego. The ego becomes the site for the 
development of the subject's character, for a person's thoughts and actions, which are an 
indication of character, are largely influenced by the negotiation which goes on between 
personal, inner wishes or desires and the myriad of external forces and influences which 
can perhaps be reduced to the term "reality" However, the unconscious needs which were 
repressed with the introduction of reality have not been obliterated, according to Freud, but 
will make their presence known in various forms which escape the censoring mechanism of 
consciousness. Hence, the occurrence of phenomena like dreams and slips of the tongue. 
According to this view, the ego nevertheless still pursues pleasure albeit in a different form. 
It is this quest for pleasure which leads to the development of selfhood. As Freud suggests 
however, our sense of selfhood is not assigned to us by the external world. Elliott (1994) 
summarises Freud's thinking on the topic of identity creation as follows : "ego-formation 
occurs through the unconscious selecting or screening of objects by identification" (p. 13). 
Here identification refers to the process "...in which the human subject 'introjects' 
attributes of other people and transforms them through the unconscious imagination" 
(ibid.). The subject incorporates these identifications to form the basis of an ego, hence 
Elliott's conclusion that "[ijdentification and incorporation are thus twin-boundary posts in 
the structuring of identity" (ibid.).
An analogy of the process of identity formation can be found in Freud's essay on 
Mourning and Melancholia (1917). In this paper, Freud suggests that in melancholia an 
object-cathexis (a loved one who is 'lost' by the subject) is replaced by an identification. 
This identification is made manifest in the melancholic's railings against himself: upon 
closer inspection Freud contends that the melancholic's self-reproaches "... are reproaches 
against a loved object which have been shifted away from it on to the patient's own ego" 
(p. 257). Freud's explanation of the process is as follows the loss of an object-choice to 
which an amount of libido was attached does not result in a normal withdrawal of libido 
from this (lost) object and subsequent displacement on to a new one - instead, libido is 
withdrawn into the ego. There, it serves to establish an identification of the ego with the 
abandoned object. Thus the object-loss is transformed into an ego-loss, and the conflict
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between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the critical activity of the 
ego and the ego as altered by identification (p. 258). A pre-condition, however, is that the 
object-choice must have been effected on a narcissistic basis, so that the object-cathexis 
regresses to narcissism.
To understand the concept of narcissism in object-choice, it is necessary to look at the 
essay On Narcissism: An Introduction (1914) where Freud explains the two ways by which 
a person may choose a love object: according to the narcissistic type or according to the 
anaclitic (attachment) type. A love object effected on a narcissistic basis means that the 
person loves another because he/she represents what he himself is, what he himself was, 
what he himself would like to be or because he/she is someone who was once part of 
himself (p. 84). As Freud does not elaborate on each of these types I can only assume that 
the last love object be understood in the literal sense i.e. as a parent loves his/her own child. 
Freud suggests in the essay on melancholia that the development of the ego consists in a 
departure from primary narcissism and gives rise to a vigorous attempt to recover that state 
(of primary narcissism). One of the means through which this state can be achieved is 
through object-cathexis, specifically, on to an ego ideal (which presumably has to bear 
some similarity to the original ego, since it is narcissistic to begin with). When libido is 
repressed, as when the subject has had to deal with the loss of a loved object, the erotic 
cathexis is felt as a severe depletion of the ego and the re-enrichment of the ego can be 
effected only by a withdrawal of libido from its objects and displacement onto the self. 
Since the melancholic has in essence absorbed his former love object within his own ego, 
the complaints he appears to be making about himself are actually directed at the other 
person. This, to Freud, explains why melancholies who appear to be filled with remorse 
and self-reproach seem to lack feelings of shame, which ought to be characteristic of the 
condition: on the contrary, they display an " ... insistent communicativeness which finds 
satisfaction in self-exposure" (1917, p. 255). From this, Freud was led to the conclusion 
that there are different parts of the ego which enable one part to set itself against the other 
and judge or criticise the other part as if it were an object. He calls this part or agency the 
conscience. Thus, Freud at this point discerns three separate agencies of the ego: 
conscience, censorship of consciousness and reality-testing. This division of the ego forms 
the basis for his (later) reformulations, discussed above, where the psyche is divided into 
three agencies, namely the id, ego and super-ego.
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The essay Beyond the Pleasure Principle links the ego with the death drive. In Part VI, 
Freud, in keeping with his dualistic view of instincts, equates the death instincts with the 
ego-instincts and opposes them to the sexual instincts. This is because "... the former 
exercise pressure towards death and the latter towards a prolongation of life" (1920, p. 
316). It would be interesting to find out when and from where the ego-instincts originate, 
since Freud states in the essay On Narcissism: An Introduction (1914) that " ... we are 
bound to suppose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual from the 
start; the ego has to be developed" (1914, p. 69). If the term ego-instincts implies that the 
instincts proceed forth from the ego (which does not exist in the individual from the start), 
then these same instincts cannot exist from the outset. However, this is not the case. The 
ego-instincts are described by Freud as self-preservative (quoted in Editor's Note to 
Instincts and their Vicissitudes, p. 111) and the self-preservative instincts originate from the 
need for nutrition in the infant - the originary instinct in the true sense of the word if we 
take the meaning of instinct, following Laplanche (1976, p. 16) to be "that which orients 
the bodily function essential to life" - yet the ego does not exist in the individual from the 
start. At the same time, it is the self-preservative instincts which engage in conflict with the 
sexual instincts. For some reason, Freud later coins the term ego-instincts and aligns them 
with the self-preservative instincts, eventually merging them together. One is led to 
speculate as to whether this alliance resulted from Freud's positing the ego as an agency of 
defence in psychical conflict. Laplanche and Pontalis (1983) define the instincts of self- 
preservation as follows . "Term by which Freud designates all needs associated with bodily 
functions necessary for the preservation of the individual; hunger provides the model of 
such instincts" (p. 220). However, from this merging of a biologically-based notion with a 
"metapsychological" one, a pattern may be discerned in Freud's dialectic : just as in the 
notion of sexuality, he begins with a biological phenomenon then expands and enlarges his 
terms of reference to encompass basically anything which can (plausibly) fall within the 
said terms. Ricoeur (1970) remarks that "Freud's writings present themselves as a mixed or 
even ambiguous discourse ... [T]here are good grounds for this apparent ambiguity, 
[namely] that this mixed discourse is the raison d'etre of psychoanalysis" (p. 65). 
Laplanche, similarly, in Life and Death in Psychoanalysis (1976) analyses Freud's writing 
from the angles of "metonymical" and "metaphorical" derivation. In interpreting Freud's 
writing it would appear that one can approach it from the quasi-biological, the speculative 
and the metaphorical.
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Freud was led to equate the death instincts with the ego-instincts probably because of the 
function he attributes to the ego with respect to the id: in bringing reality to bear upon the 
psychical apparatus, the ego disposes of excessive vital energy contained in the id, binding 
this energy for discharge. Laplanche (1976) links the ego and the id as follows : "These life 
drives [of the id] are found in desexualized form in the ego; the ego is a transmitter of the 
id's "vital" energy, which it purifies, dominates, and channels as best it can" (p. 53). It is 
the id's excessive energy which creates tension and excitation within the mental apparatus. 
Since the ego functions to reduce this energy and its resulting tension , the ego must, 
following Freud's logic, be seen to serve the pleasure principle - which in turn, serves the 
death drive. Freud had earlier described the ego-instincts as self-preservative. The inherent 
ambiguity of the term "ego-instincts", which was pointed out earlier, is acknowledged as 
well by Laplanche and Pontalis (1983) in that these instincts are tendencies emanating from 
the ego and directed towards external objects but at the same time, they are viewed as 
attached to the ego as if to their object (p. 147). By aligning these self-preservative 
instincts with the death-instincts, Freud in effect implies paradoxically that the death 
instincts actually attempt to preserve the life of the organism. The only way to make sense 
of this is to read it simultaneously at two separate levels, namely the biological and the 
dynamic (i.e. with respect to the discharge of psychic energy). When Freud says that the 
sexual instincts push towards a prolongation of life he is speaking in terms of biology, for it 
is the sexual instincts which enable procreation which in turn, ultimately enables the 
continued existence of the species. When he equates the ego-instincts with the death 
instincts, on the other hand, he is presumably referring to the action of the ego which binds 
the excessive energy contained in the id - resulting in the expulsion of the energy and the 
lowering of psychical tension. Thus he says that : " ... the life process of the individual 
leads for internal reasons to an abolition of chemical tensions, that is to say, to death ..." 
(Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1920, p. 329). Two factors led Freud to the idea of the 
death drive, namely the repetition of unpleasant memories in the dreams of war neurotics, 
and the tendency for the psychical apparatus to adhere to the Nirvana principle. The 
replaying of unpleasant memories in the case of war neurotics subjected the ego to fresh 
attacks of anxiety, introducing excessive psychic energy into the mental apparatus which 
was surely an unpleasurable experience. Freud's attempt to explain this phenomenon 
however, (unintentionally?) links the death drive to the self-preservative instinct when he 
maintains that the traumatic neurosis came about because the mind had not been prepared 
for the influx of stimuli brought on by fright : "It [the element of fright] is caused by lack
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of any preparedness for anxiety, including lack of hypercathexis of the systems that would 
be the first to receive the stimulus. Owing to their low cathexis those systems are not in a 
good position for binding the inflowing amounts of excitation ... [while] preparedness for 
anxiety and the hypercathexis of the receptive system constitute the last line of defence of 
the shield [the ego] against stimuli" (1920, p. 303). The dreams experienced by war 
neurotics thus "... are endeavouring to master the stimulus retrospectively, by developing 
the anxiety whose omission was the cause of the traumatic neurosis" (ibid., p. 304). Is not 
this an attempt at self-preservation? At the same time, as a manifestation of the repetition 
compulsion, these dreams embody the death drive. The death drive and the self- 
preservative instinct here seem to serve the same purpose: by repeating the unpleasant 
memory the mind attempts to develop a defence against excessive stimuli. 
Nuttall (1996), in adapting this idea to the use of tragedy for a kind of emotional 
enrichment, suggests that the pleasure of tragedy may take on a more proactive goal, 
namely as "practice for crises" (p. 76). Thus the spectator revels not in watching another 
person suffer per se but by identifying and suffering with the protagonist, purges his/her 
own emotions (thereby lowering the level of psychic tension) and develops as it were a 
readiness for similar (future) emotional upheaval: a form of defence for the ego.
Freud appears to have been aware of the paradox inherent in his theory but refused to 
entertain the possibility that the death drive and the self-preservative instinct could have the 
same goal. This is why he states that "[w]e were prepared at one stage ... to include the so- 
called self-preservative instincts of the ego among the death instincts, but we subsequently 
... corrected ourselves on this point and withdrew it" (1920, p. 326). At the same time, he 
concedes that " ... we cannot ascribe to the sexual instinct the characteristic of a 
compulsion to repeat which first puts us on the track of the death instincts" (ibid., p. 329). 
That being the case, the logical step would have been to abandon the theory altogether - but 
Freud holds fast to it. Laplanche and Pontalis (1983) suggest that the introduction of the 
death instinct was a structurally necessary response in the evolution of Freud's thought in 
the 1920s. They posit that the need for the theory of the death instinct had already been 
made apparent in Freud's earlier theoretical models. Freud could not account for the 
repetition phenomena in terms of the pleasure principle except to conclude that whatever 
psychical force induced this phenomenon must necessarily operate in opposition to the 
pleasure principle. Thus, "... this hypothesis, pushed in turn to its logical conclusion, led 
him to see the death instinct as the very epitome of instinct" (p. 98). It was also
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inconceivable to Freud that hate could be derived from the sexual instincts. Laplanche 
quotes Freud (1915cr) in Instincts and their Vicissitudes as stating that " ... the true 
prototypes of the relation of hate are derived not from sexual life, but from the ego's 
struggle to preserve and maintain itself (p. 99).
With the introduction of the concept of narcissism, where sexual drives are directed toward 
the self, a pattern of psychic circularity was identified by Freud, as pointed out by Williams 
(1995) where the repetitious nature of war trauma, the child's 'fort-da' game as well as the 
recreation in some analytic situations of the patient's most disturbing experiences all point 
to a deflection of psychic darkness on to the self (p. 157). According to Williams, the value 
of these repetitions is initially to be found in the 1914 paper on technique Remembering, 
Repeating, Working-Through, in which it is suggested that the compulsion to repeat forms 
part of the process of healing. If repetition is part of the process of healing, it again 
amounts to an attempt at self-preservation and as such, serves the death instinct. 
However, since Freud was unwilling to equate the death drive with the self-preservative 
instinct it would perhaps be more fruitful to explore alternative interpretations of the 
concept of the death drive.
Boothby (1991) suggests an alternative rereading of the death drive using Lacan's 
interpretation of the ego. Lacan introduced the three fundamental registers: the imaginary, 
the symbolic and the real. In discussing the formation of the ego, however, it is the 
imaginary register which will be of primary concern. Elliott (1994) describes the imaginary 
order as the pre-linguistic, pre-Oedipal state of being prior to differentiation and 
individuation. It is "... a peculiar realm of ideal completeness, merging all that is inside 
with that which is outside" (p. 93). Within this imaginary realm of being according to 
Lacan, the part-objects of the mother's body (breasts, lips, gaze and so on) are given an 
emotional investment by the child. The imaginary was inaugurated with Lacan's theory of 
the mirror stage. According to Boothby, this theory was inspired by research in ethology 
which associated behaviour patterns in animals with the perception of specific visual 
images (p. 18). Lacan believed that a similar function operates in human beings. Boothby 
summarises Lacan's theory as follows: "In the "mirror phase," the most rudimentary 
formations of psychic life are organized for the six- to eighteen-month-old infant as it 
identifies itself with a body image; either its own image in a mirror, or that of a caretaker or 
peer" (ibid.). The importance of this theory is that in locating the origin of selfhood in the 
mirror phase Lacan was able to account for the origin of the ego, namely, as a formation of
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the imaginary. The infant makes an imaginary identification with the reflected image, and 
imagines himself to be a unified subject. Prior to this realisation, the infant has presumably 
not realised that the various limbs on his body are actually connected to one another and 
can be co-ordinated.
Lacan linked the ego with the death instinct through the idea of the alienating effect of the 
imaginary. This emerges when the human infant "gains the first inkling of its bodily 
integrity" (Boothby, p. 24) through the specular image (either of itself in the mirror, or 
another human being). Laplanche (1976) explains that the notion behind the mirror stage is 
that it is not necessarily confined to visual perception alone but is "only the index of... [the 
process of] the recognition of the form of another human and the concomitant precipitation 
within the individual of a first outline of that form" (p. 81) and thus includes tactile 
perceptions as well: any perception, in other words, which delimits self from other. This 
realisation is, however, described as alienating because while it introduces the idea of a 
complete self to the infant, it also introduces a profound confusion of self and other in that 
the image perceived by the infant while it may be his own reflection in the mirror is 
nevertheless an other in the sense that this specular image (or imago)reflects a unified 
whole while in reality, the infant is still lacking in motor co-ordination. It is therefore, 
imaginary since it "represents an ideal of unity" (quoted in Boothby, p. 25) which the infant 
has yet to achieve, as he is still dependent on others in real life. As Elliott (1994) states, the 
mirror stage is profoundly imaginary because the image of unified selfhood which it 
generates is opposed to the bodily fragmentation that the infant experiences (p. 94). 
Selfhood is thus based on misrecognition. This imaginary formation "...mobilize[s] a 
nascent sense of identity and ... introduce[s] directedness into the chaos of infantile 
impulses" (Boothby, p. 26). Lacan was thus able to state that in a similar fashion, the ego is 
essentially a formation of the imaginary, constituted in relation to the perceptual imago of 
the body, formed when the infant relates his own body to the imago. Like the body image it 
perceives, the ego resembles a bounded unity. This identification however, takes place in 
the psychical apparatus. As such , the ego cannot be taken to be identical with the human, 
physical subject. To Lacan, the ego has to be differentiated from the subject : "...the 
unconscious is the unknown subject of the ego,... it is misrecognized ... by the ego, which 
is ... [the core of our being]....The core of our being does not coincide with the ego" 
(quoted in Boothby, p.36). The ego, in other words, is an internal object, a fictive and 
alienating formation which fills what Lacan terms an imaginary function. The core of our
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being, which is real, does not coincide with the ego because the ego exists only in the 
imaginary. Thus Boothby says that "[t]he imaginary formation of the ego is alienating not 
just because it is modeled on an other outside the subject but because imaginary 
identification somehow splits the subject from itself (p. 47).
To explain the concept of imaginary alienation Boothby considers the ego from the aspect 
of what he terms "psychic energetics", as it was the problem of the investment and 
disinvestment of energy in the ego and its objects which led Freud to propose his theory of 
narcissism thus paving the way for the theory of the death instinct. In the essay Project for 
a Scientific Psychology (1895) Freud, according to Boothby, attempted to construct a 
quantitative account of the psychic apparatus. He did this by recourse to a model of 
neuronic activity which mimics the operation of the psychic apparatus as a whole. The 
function of the psychic apparatus is to regulate the flow of energy (which results from 
neuronal excitation), and operates upon two basic principles, that of neuronic inertia or 
neuronic constancy. Neuronic inertia is achieved through the complete discharge of energy 
by passing it along a relay of neurones or directing the energy so that it is expended in 
motor activity. Alternatively, the energy is stored and establishes a reservoir of energy for 
the organism, thus ensuring that the organism is once again stabilised. It is this set of 
neurones, which operates in the second instance to stabilise the organism, which is "... 
identified with the secondary organization of the ego" (Boothby, p. 53). The ego here is 
therefore an "essentially defensive, regulatory structure" (ibid.). Lacan seizes upon this 
explanation to serve as an analogy for the construction of the ego which he relates to the 
idea of a visual gestalt, where a figure comes sharply into focus by blurring away its 
surrounding background. In a similar fashion, the ego "...is constructed by means of a 
bifurcation within the total economy of organismic excitations ... [and] inevitably 
represents a reduction of the total quantity of excitation, a limited charge that has been 
siphoned off and forced to circulate within the confines of a closed structure" (ibid., p. 54). 
In this way , Lacan is able to link the unconscious with the formation of the ego in that the 
unconscious is constituted essentially by what is refused, or, to use Freud's term, what is 
repressed.
To return to the notion of imaginary alienation, it appears that in the mirror stage it is the 
self which is alienated from itself. By identifying with the imago, psychic identity is 
achieved. However, like the figure perceived in a visual gestalt there is always something
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left out (in the surrounding background) which is not perceived because it has to be 
excluded in order for the imago to emerge into focus. Viewed from the aspect of psychic 
energetics, the ego can thus be seen to inhibit as well as refuse as it discharges energy, 
while repression is accorded a primordial status in that it occurs with the recognition of the 
imago: "What is split off [through repression] is not a particular psychic content or 
representation, but a quantity of energy that might otherwise animate such a representation" 
(ibid., p. 67). This interpretation of the agency known as the ego can subsequently be 
linked to what Freud called the "death drive" in that, as Boothby explains it, the source of 
this drive lies in the tension between the real of the body and the imaginary of its mental 
schema. It is described as a drive because it consists of somatic energies which have been 
alienated by the imaginary, yet strive for representation. By explaining the death drive in 
terms of psychic energy, Lacan in effect locates the target or object of the death drive not in 
the biological organism but in the unity of the ego. In this way, he manages to avoid the 
impasse a biological interpretation would inevitably produce, which would render the 
notion of the death drive illogical.
Lacan's theory of "the mirror stage" attempts to account for "the new psychical action" 
necessary for the emergence of the ego. Freud, on the other hand, appears to have been 
undecided as to how the ego emerges, or for that matter, what the term ego itself refers to. 
Laplanche (1976) points out that at times the term refers to the individual as differentiated 
from the other, "... the biological individual but also the psychological individual as the 
site of conflict: what is at stake in the conflict, but not a participant in it" (p. 50). At other 
times the ego "... is taken as an "agency", and, for that reason, as one of the protagonists in 
the conflict splitting the individual" (ibid.). This suggests to Laplanche that the slippage of 
meaning corresponds to a slippage in reality itself, which is why the term can be viewed as 
a metonym as well as a metaphor. Viewed metaphorically, the ego is seen to be a 
displacement of the living individual and of its image to another site, and consequently as a 
kind of intrapsychical reality, an intrapsychical precipitate in the image of the individual (p. 
53). As to whether it is an image of the self, Laplanche observes that it would be useless to 
differentiate between the ego and the self because "... the genesis of the ego itself is 
marked by the indissolubly linked image of self and other" (p. 54). As in the case of the 
emergence of sexuality, the formation of the ego "props itself upon" a vital function, the 
need for nutrition. Since the infant's first contact with another human is during feeding, it is 
most likely at this stage of complete dependence that he/she comes to distinguish between
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him/herself and the individual who provides satisfaction of his/her needs. Thus Laplanche 
states that the instinct of self-preservation "... far from being in conflict with sexuality, 
shows it the path toward its object" (p. 74). The sexual drives are at the outset, as Freud 
states, attached to the satisfaction of the ego-drives, and this occurs at a very early stage in 
the life of the infant. This implies that the process of ego-formation too, has to occur at an 
extremely early stage. Lacan's theory of the mirror stage inaugurates the process of ego- 
formation, where the ego is formed through identification. This process can presumably 
carry on throughout the duration of the individual's life, and identification can be with 
reference to a whole object (person) or particular character traits and so forth. The effect of 
identification can be as Laplanche puts it, definitive i.e. have a structuring effect, or 
transitory as in the case of hysterical identification (p. 80). To sum it up, the ego "is formed 
from perceptions and primarily from the perception of a fellow creature" (p. 83).
Critics of the death drive appear to be of the opinion in some form or other, that this 
instinct was conceptualised as a result of elaborate theory spinning on Freud's part. 
Laplanche and Pontalis (1983) for instance, think that Freud was so concerned to uphold 
his thesis of the death instinct despite the rejection of the theory by the psychoanalytic 
circle "... because of the theoretical value of the concept and its concordance with a 
particular view of instinct ..." (p. 99). This view held that instincts had to be structurally 
dualistic in nature, a tendency fundamental to Freudian thought. The death instinct was, in 
other words, posited by Freud as the opposition to the life instincts or Eros, pushed to its 
logical conclusion, especially since the phenomenon which marked its existence, namely 
repetition, tended to oppose the pleasure principle.
Fenichel (1935) in his commentary on the death instinct traces the origin of this new 
classification of instinct to the failure of Freud's first class of instincts to account for his 
discoveries concerning narcissism. According to Fenichel, the death instinct was based on 
both speculation as well as clinical evidence. He locates the speculative aspect in the 
"conservative" character of the instincts, the so-called "Nirvana principle". The psychic 
apparatus is likened to a reflexive apparatus which strives to discharge any external 
stimulus that excites or disturbs it, hence the use of the term "Nirvana" Fenichel is of the 
opinion that Freud in his essay clearly demonstrated that under certain circumstances the 
tendency to discharge or bind excessive excitation far exceeded the strength of the pleasure 
principle. Since Freud was dealing with "inorganic substances" it was legitimate to call this
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"Nirvana" death. The question was whether this consideration should be applied to all the 
instincts or only for some (pp. 364-365). For the sexual instincts actually appear to seek out 
stimulation rather than eliminate it. From clinical evidence on the other hand, Freud found 
that aggressive tendencies constitute a high percentage of all human instinctual impulses. 
Masochism was found, in analysis, to be the turning of sadistic impulses against the self. 
Based on these two opposing sets of evidence, Freud produced his new instinctual theory. 
Fenichel's bone of contention with Freud's latest formulation of instincts lies in the use of 
the term instinct itself. He quotes Freud's definition of instinctual need being "the demand 
made by the body upon the psychic apparatus" (p. 366). The problem also lies to some 
extent in the English translation of Freud's term trieb . As Gay (1995) notes,"drive" is 
closer linguistically and in meaning to Freud's intentions (p. 564 n.l). The editors of the 
Standard Edition use the term 'instinct' instead and as a result, the term is generally 
adopted in the discussion of Freud's theories, sometimes interchangeably with 'drive' 
(Laplanche, 1976, p. 214). It is useful however, to distinguish the difference between the 
two terms. Laplanche explains that Freud used the two terms in quite distinct senses. To 
Freud, trieb was used to denote "...a pressure that is relatively indeterminate both as 
regards the behaviour it induces and as regards the satisfying object ..." (ibid.). The term 
trieb first appears in Freud's writings in 1905, specifically in his Three Essays on the 
Theory of Sexuality. The idea however, originated much earlier on when Freud made a 
distinction between two types of excitation to which the organism is subjected , and which 
it must discharge in accordance with the principle of constancy, the external and internal 
excitation, the latter of which the organism cannot evade and which is the basis of the 
functioning of the psychical apparatus.
Ricoeur (1970) observes that "Beyond the Pleasure Principle is the least hermeneutic and 
most speculative of Freud's essays; in saying this I refer to the enormous part played in that 
essay by hypotheses, by heuristic constructs, which are pushed to their extreme 
consequences" (p. 281) and that "... there is an excess of hypothesis compared with its 
fragmentary and partial verifications" (p. 282). He argues that the death instinct was 
introduced first and foremost to account for a set of facts which centre around the 
compulsion to repeat and in a second movement, recognised and deciphered in a number of 
clinical phenomena and then in a third movement, recognised and deciphered as 
destructiveness, on the individual plane and on the historical and cultural planes (p. 282). 
Like Fenichel, Ricoeur locates the speculative aspect in the hypothesis of the automatic
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regulation of the psychical processes according to the principle of constancy. The supposed 
breakthrough occurs, however, according to Ricoeur, when Freud links the predicate of 
being "instinctual" with the compulsion to repeat and declares that " ... an instinct is an 
urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has 
been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces ... to put it another 
way, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life" (p. 289). By attributing the status 
of instinct to the compulsion to repeat, inertia is placed "on an equal footing with the life 
instinct" (ibid.) - thereby enabling the notion of inertia to be pushed to its extreme, namely, 
to death. The crux of the issue for Ricoeur, is that Freud was basically conforming - again - 
to his dualistic view of instinct : "The result of this tortuous discussion is therefore a 
straightforward dualism of instincts" (p. 291). He recognises however, that Freud probably 
had a specific purpose in this new instinct theory: the recognition that the living substance 
by itself can find only death whereas the conjugation of two mortal substances allows the 
possibility of a fight against death. This principle of cohesion, attributed to Eros will be 
applied in Freud's later writings where he shifts the emphasis from biological expressions 
to cultural expressions, culminating in the "metaculture" of Civilisation and Its Discontents 
(1930). A corresponding shift occurs in Freud's own interpretation of the death instinct, 
locating it first in the realm of the id, ego and superego and later in the collective "sense of 
guilt" which keeps the individual's desire for aggression in check.
Freud's psychoanalytic theories of psychic conflict suggest a reading of Jacobean drama, 
particularly revenge tragedy as an examination of the notion of selfhood and identity in the 
face of social change and upheaval. The organisation of Freud's essays on sexuality, for 
instance, implies a destruction of the popular, biologizing image of sexuality (Laplanche, 
1976, p. 14), in that beginning with the topic "Sexual Aberrations" Freud shows how 
extended the field of perversions is, thereby demolishing the idea of a determined aim or 
object for human sexuality. If such a basic human instinct as sexuality has to be controlled 
and regulated by the demands of reality, then it is inevitable that the subject falls prey to 
conflict. By installing sexuality as the basic human instinct, the basis of psychic 
development and conflict, Freud resituates the source of selfhood within the self albeit 
beyond the conscious control of the individual. As a product of internal conflict (the self 
against the self i.e. the ego vs. the id, the ego vs. the superego but also the sexual instinct 
against the death instinct) yet subject also to external (repressing) factors, it is no wonder 
that the subject craves for the quiescence of "Nirvana" or "death". In revenge tragedy, a
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basic pattern may be discerned in the structure of the plays and certain motifs are repeated 
by the various playwrights albeit adapted to "the personal vision" of the particular 
playwright. One of these motifs is the play-within-the-play. Hallett and Hallett (1980) state 
that "... the whole structure of the revenge tragedy can be understood in terms of the 
revenger's efforts to free himself from the restraints that forbid the act of vengeance, a 
process that involves moving from sanity to madness" (p. 9). To achieve this end, the 
revenger "must reject what is best in him" and this involves a radical shift in the way the 
psyche views the world. Thus, Hallett and Hallett suggest that the play-within-the-play, as 
the vehicle by which the revenger achieves his goal, is the culmination of the revenger's 
efforts to restructure and remodel his world : the "entrance into this self-created illusory 
world is what finally allows the revenger to act" (p. 10). Following up this idea of a "self- 
created illusory world" I will explore a logical development to the play-within-the-play, 
namely role-playing. Role-playing here however, will not be confined to the play-within- 
the-play, which culminates in the murder of the villain. Using the concept of identification, 
it is possible to show that it is the series of identifications and introjections which he 
undergoes prior to the final act of revenge itself which enables the revenger to act so 
completely out of character. The play-within-the-play as a revenge motif therefore 
symbolises the blurring of the limits between self and other, fantasy and reality that occurs 
in a theatrical encounter carried to its extreme. The pre-eminence of revenge tragedy in 
Jacobean theatre suggests the questioning, at the time, of moral and legal rights which had 
hitherto been assumed to be part and parcel of being a subject of the state.
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVENGE TRAGEDY: ROLE PLAYING AND IDENTITY
Joan Lord Hall (1991) explores the concept of role-playing as it is presented in late- 
Renaissance/ Jacobean tragedy and suggests that role-playing was more than a convention 
in the drama of the period, it supplied a means for the fictional characters to "... discover 
their potential through playing different parts" (p. 1) and this mirrors real life in that 
"histrionic awareness, or a conscious dramatisation of self , can enhance or undermine 
identity" (ibid.). This corroborates Freud's theory on ego-formation and creation of identity 
where he posits that ego-formation occurs through the unconscious selecting or screening 
of objects by identification. By introjecting attributes of other people and identifying with 
others the basis for the structure of an ego is established. Jacobean tragedy frequently 
portrays protagonists who "assume personae and are subsequently changed by them" 
(ibid.). In revenge tragedy this process is noticeably reproduced in each play. The notion of 
the dynamic of role-playing, in other words, is incorporated into the structure of revenge 
tragedy. Hall examines the potential of role-playing for identity creation and points out that 
Jacobean playwrights on the whole explored both the creative as well as destructive 
potentiality of assuming a persona. Revenge tragedy arguably, pushes the notion of role- 
playing to its worst possible limits. Hall (p. 23) states:
More sharply than other genres, revenge plays define and explore the pressures of the 
role -whether it is felt to be alien or willingly assumed - on the dramatic self. The 
ontological challenge for the main protagonist is how to commit himself to retaliation 
and still retain his integrity: how to assume the role of revenger without becoming 
engulfed in savagery.
Thus, the notion of a stable, autonomous identity is questioned in this genre. While 
psychoanalytic theory has supplied various definitions of the self and self-identity as 
pointed out by Elliott (1994, p. 8-9), for the purposes of this thesis the primarily Freudian 
view on identity will be adopted: that is, that identity is structured through identification 
with, and incorporation of, others; and furthermore, that the identificatory process is 
engendered in and through loss. Identity, in other words, is not static; for if structures of 
identity are formed in relation to other individuals, then so too will changes in social
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relationships affect the nature of the self (Elliott, 1994, p. 14). As Hall (1991) states, the 
revenger's situation questions the concept of the self-autonomous subject because he is not 
allowed to ignore the atrocities which have been committed against his loved ones. 
Something will not allow the revenger to overlook the crime, whether it is the appearance 
of the ghost of the murdered victim (as in Hamlet), the victim/revenger's own grief (as in 
the case of Hieronimo and Titus Andronicus) or the fact of the villain's continued assault 
on the victim's family (as in The Revenger's Tragedy). As such, "turning the other cheek" 
is generally not presented as a viable option in any of these plays.
By mirroring and reproducing the violence and bloodshed that has befallen his own family 
the revenger attempts to achieve a form of satisfaction or appeasement from his mental 
anguish. This however can only be achieved after a process of reinventing the self, a form 
of self-fashioning. By adopting a persona, the revenger is able to carry out his violent and 
bloody act of revenge because, like role-playing in theatre, the supposed "fictionality of 
[the] setting can initiate activity more daring, volatile, and free than the constraints and 
dangers of the world ordinarily allow" (Wilshire, 1982, p. 24). Unlike theatre however, the 
mayhem the revenger commits in his own piece of role-playing is not "an imagined 
experience of total activity" (p. 26). So far as the world of the play is concerned, the blood 
he draws is real, his victims will not get up and walk away once the curtain falls on his 
performance. Nevertheless, to a certain extent the revenger undergoes the same process of 
psychic transformation that an actor undergoes for theatre. If there is any truth to the 
psychoanalytic concepts of identity formation, particularly Lacan's theory of the mirror 
stage, then it is to be expected that within the boundaries of the revenger's world, role- 
playing and particularly the process of identification with, and introjection of 
characteristics of, other characters found in the revenger's environment exert an important 
influence on the revenger with respect to the process of reinvention of self or to use 
Greenblatt's term, "self-fashioning" which the revenger must undergo in order to 
ultimately achieve his goal of revenge. For the individual revenger portrayed in each of the 
plays is not by nature (as far as we know, given the plot of each play) given to treachery 
and cunning but rather has to refashion himself, to adopt a new persona in each instance 
before revenge can be executed. Revenge tragedy in other words may be viewed as an 
exploration of the process of identity formation in the Lacanian sense. It is linked to the
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death instinct because of the confusion that arises as a result of the identification which 
splits the subject, in this case, the revenger, from himself. By taking on a new persona the 
revenger in most cases has to repress the side of himself which will not allow him to carry 
out revenge - for ease of reference let us call it his "better side" : as Hall states, "The usual 
pattern is for the revenger to absorb the dramatic character, either destroying or severely 
diminishing any individual self (1991, p. 24). However, does he manage to suppress this 
side so successfully as to effect a complete transformation in character - or does he merely 
affect a pose right until the end?
Hallett and Hallett (1980, p. 9) suggest that the madness universally found in revenge 
tragedy is an integral part of the revenge theme which enables the revenger to free himself 
from the restraints that forbid the act of vengeance. While madness is an entirely plausible 
response to the situation in which the revenger finds himself, it fails to account for the 
change in his psyche which enables the accomplishment of the act of vengeance. In the 
course of this thesis, through the examination of the psyches of the individual revengers 
which will be exposed by their actions and their words, I hope to demonstrate that role- 
playing within the character of the revenger is not merely confined to the series of disguises 
or dissemblances he adopts in order to achieve his revenge, but rather, the habit of playing 
roles is deeply ingrained in the revenger. As an initial hypothesis, it is assumed that an 
examination of the development of character of the revenger from beginning to end, paying 
close attention to the responses he shows to other characters within each play who are in a 
similar plight, will reveal that it is these kindred characters who exert a formative influence 
on the revenger in each case. It is almost as though the revenger needs to be confronted by 
the spectacle of another victim seeking vengeance in order for him to realise what he 
himself must do.
In Thomas Kyd's The Spanish Tragedy Hieronimo is Knight Marshal in the court of the 
King of Spain, "an officer of the royal household with judicial authority over the palace 
and its environs" (Maus, 1995, p. 331). Clearly, he is in a position of considerable 
authority; within the body of the play, second only to the royal family. His tragedy begins 
when he discovers the body of his only son Horatio hanging in the arbour in his own 
garden, murdered by Lorenzo's servants. His grief is apparent (2.4.76-95); however, a more
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immediate concern is to discover the murderers, for "To know the author were some ease 
of grief/ For in revenge my heart would find relief (2.4.102-103). He further pledges in 
lines 113-118 to keep Horatio's handkerchief, "besmeared with blood" with him until 
revenge has been exacted, and similarly, preserve Horatio's body, unburied until such time. 
Kerrigan (1996) suggests that "Hieronimo sets out to secure retribution by equipping 
himself with objects charged with remembrance: the corpse, a surrogate ghost to whet his 
purpose should it ever blunt, and the gory napkin, a memento ..." (p. 174). Thus, for 
Kerrigan, the play focuses around the relationship between memory and revenge. At the 
same time, Hieronimo questions the idea of justice, both earthly and divine:
O sacred heavens! If this unhallowed deed ...
Shall unrevealed and unrevenged pass
How should we term your dealings to be just
If you unjustly deal with those that in your justice trust? (3.2.5-11)
Thus must we toil in other men's extremes,
That know not how to remedy our own,
And do them justice when unjustly we
For all our wrongs can compass no redress. (3.6.1 -4)
His office, which is essentially to deal justice to those who have been wronged now 
becomes a chore and he appears to be merely playing the role of adjudicator without 
believing in what he is doing any more:
This toils my body, this consumeth age:
That only I to all men just must be,
And neither gods nor men be just to me. (3.6.8-10)
Nevertheless, he administers justice according to the law even though he himself cannot 
receive the like: this is demonstrated in his sentencing of Pedringano to death for the 
murder of Serberine (11. 35-40). However, the act of so doing and more importantly the 
sight of Pedringano's unrepentant insolence for his crime causes Hieronimo to remember
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his own anguish at the murder of Horatio which thus far, goes unpunished because 
Hieronimo has yet to discover the authors of the crime: "This makes me to remember thee, 
my son" (3.6.99). When left alone for awhile (3.7) Hieronimo bemoans the fact that he 
cannot make public his grief which so tortures his soul, and that justice and revenge seem 
to be beyond his reach, "... placed in those empyreal heights,/ Where, countermured with 
walls of diamond,/ I find the place impregnable" (11. 15-17). At this central point in the 
play, Hieronimo wavers on the cusp, desiring at the same time two antithetical ends. He 
wants justice and he wants revenge; he attributes them to the same source, yet realises that 
the two together are beyond his reach. In the subsequent speech within the same scene, 
having discovered the identity of his son's murderers, Hieronimo polarises his desires. 
While in the final couplet (11.72, 73) he vows to "... either purchase justice by entreats,/ Or 
tire them all with my revenging threats", his earlier words inform us that it is in fact 
revenge that he desires : "But wherefore waste I mine unfruitful words/ When naught but 
blood will satisfy my woes?" (11. 67, 68). In favouring revenge over justice Hieronimo takes 
the first step towards the dissolution of his perceived identity, because in calling for blood 
and revenge he is setting his self against justice. Bowers (1940) informs us that "... justice 
was the sole prerogative of the Elizabethan state, with any encroachment on its newly won 
privilege liable to severe punishment" (p. 8) and as such, "[p]rivate blood-revenge ... had 
no legal place in Elizabethan England" (p. 10). Further to this, Bowers argues that there 
was a custom of revenge which, while not superseding the law, nevertheless had a 
concurrent authority in the minds of the people. As Knight Marshal, Kyd's character 
Hieronimo is in a prime position to understand the fine distinction between legal justice 
and private revenge. While he deliberately conjoins them in the speech quoted above, he 
also makes clear that together they cannot coexist. Bowers further states that as far as 
Elizabethan law was concerned, "[b]lood- revenge for the murder of a close relative ... falls 
in the same legal category as any other murder with malice aforethought" (p. 11). The 
cleavage in Hieronimo's identity thus begins to show, his private grief threatening to over- 
ride his public persona. Hieronimo's decision to "... cry aloud for justice through the 
court" (3.7.70) implies that while he has privately determined upon a course of revenge, the 
residue of his public persona demands that he go through the motions of attempting to 
procure justice.
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In the next scene where we see Hieronimo however (3.11), his mask as it were slips 
noticeably. He meets two Portingales who ask to be shown the way to the house of the 
Duke of Castile, Lorenzo's father. Upon being asked if the Duke's son were there, 
Hieronimo replies "Who, my Lord Lorenzo?" (1. 8) the mention of whose name unleashes 
his pent up, repressed anger; whereupon he launches into a tirade detailing a description of 
a place "... where murderers have built/ A habitation for their cursed souls" (11.26, 27) - in 
other words, hell - and states that it is here that Lorenzo may be found. His outburst 
convinces the Portingales that he is mad; however, in Freudian terms it might be seen as a 
form of release from the excessive mental stimulation or excitation from within which 
threatens to overwhelm his psyche. He is, in his own mind, damning Lorenzo to hell for his 
crime. In this manner he attempts to master the situation and seems to regress to the state 
of "megalomania" mentioned by Freud in the essay On Narcissism (1914) which exists in 
the mental life of children and primitive people "a belief in the thaumaturgic force of 
words, and a technique for dealing with the external world" (p. 67). Hieronimo's shock at 
the traumatic discovery of Horatio's body hanging in the arbour has resulted in a psychic 
regression to a childlike state of mind in which his defined moral universe as an adult no 
longer exists. Later Hieronimo will set out, as a child will set out, to explore the moral 
dimensions of his newborn world. Since Lorenzo is, in a sense, the parent/initiator/author 
of Hieronimo's new psyche, Hieronimo, like the little boy in Freud's fort-da game who 
mimics his mother's action of leaving him, mimics Lorenzo's action of conspiring to 
murder. In this manner, he identifies with the desire of his enemies thereby losing his own 
identity, the loss of which will soon be complete.
Following immediately upon this, Hieronimo contemplates for himself the fate he has 
wished upon Lorenzo. With a poniard in one hand and a rope in the other he tries to decide 
which path to take to hell. The point to note here is that Hieronimo knows that suicide must 
lead to eternal damnation, yet turns his sights towards hell because it offers the possibility 
of justice (3.12.6-13) which appears to be slipping beyond his reach on earth. However, 
rememberance of his loss (Kerrigan, 1996, p. 176) brings him back to earth and he 
determines to avenge himself on Lorenzo and Balthazar by fair means. When he is 
prevented by Lorenzo from pleading his case before the king, Hieronimo once more aligns 
himself with the forces of evil and vows vengeance; of greater significance, however, is his
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proclaimed surrender of his marshalship (3.12.76-78). This is the point, referred to above, 
at which Hieronimo' loss of identity is complete. He appears to cast aside forever his 
public role, opting instead to pursue justice for his private grievance even at the cost of his 
eternal soul. The fate he wishes upon his enemies is projected this time upon himself, so 
reminiscent of Freud's death drive turning aggression upon the subject's own self.
In the next scene Hieronimo again weighs his options, vacillating between divine 
intervention and Senecan vindication. Kerrigan (1996, p. 177) points out the deadlock of 
uncertainty expressed in the soliloquy ' Vindicta mihi\ ... ' (3.13.1 -44):
As Knight Marshal, a legal official, the kind of 'civil magistrate that the marginal 
glosses of the Geneva Bible equate with Paul's 'minister of God', Hieronimo is 
entitled to exact blood for the murder of his son. Yet because he would be acting in his 
own case- as a hating father not dispassionate judge - he cannot take the blood which in 
another sense he should. Destabilized by this, Hieronimo is denied that vengeance 
which, for Elizabethan audiences, was the most essential adjunct of his office. ... His 
will, in other words, is puzzled, and he consoles himself with classical commonplaces 
[taken from Seneca].
If the psychic split prior to this was between the public self and the private, the contest here 
appears to be between the eternal soul and secular desire. Bowers states that at this point 
Hieronimo becomes a villain, as he "consciously gives up an open revenge in favour of a 
secret, treacherous device" (p. 77). The progression (or regression, as the case may be, 
from the moral angle) of his psychic development has gradually built up to this climax, 
where he discards his own identity and adopts for himself the role of villain, and plots to 
mirror and reproduce the crime that his enemies have commited. This has been achieved in 
stages as his identity mutates and finally comes to resemble that of Horatio's murderers. 
The various roles he undertakes too, which for ease of reference will be contrasted as 
private versus public, appear to have been reversed. Previously he has been able to separate 
his private woes from his public duty :
... blood with blood shall, while I sit as judge, 
Be satisfied, and the law discharged. 
And though myself cannot receive the like,
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Yet will I see that others have their right. (3.6.35-38)
Now however, the public persona and the private merge and become confused, as is 
witnessed in the scene with Don Bazulto. Arguably, Hieronimo's public persona as Knight 
Marshal, dispenser of justice may have been one imposed upon him; given his initial 
instinctive response upon the discovery of Horatio's body, which was to swear revenge 
rather than sue for justice (2.4.113-118), one may be inclined to believe that his faith in 
legal redress is merely a front. The continuous frustration of his efforts to obtain legal 
vengeance leads to his adopting another role, that of cunning revenger:
No, no, Hieronimo, thou must enjoin
Thine eyes to observation, and thy tongue
To milder speeches than thy spirit affords,
Thy heart to patience, and thy hands to rest,
Thy cap to courtesy, and thy knee to bow,
Till to revenge thou know when, where and how. (3.13.39-44)
Hieronimo's public persona however, continues to make demands on him. Three citizens 
and an old man come to see him to bid him plead their respective cases before the king. 
However, it is Don Bazulto the old man whose case provokes an instant reaction from 
Hieronimo, for it resembles closely his own situation : " ... 'The humble supplication/ Of 
Don Bazulto for his murdered son'" (3.13.78, 79). Hieronimo identifies with Don Bazulto's 
plight : " ... wretched I, in thy mishaps, may see/ The lively portrait of my dying self 
(3.13.84, 85) but contrasts Don Bazulto as living while he himself by comparison, is dying. 
This comparison reflects Hieronimo's perception of himself as ineffectual and 
unproductive with respect to the procuring of justice and vengeance for his slain son. The 
sight of the bloody handkerchief he draws out to wipe Don Bazulto's tears however, 
reminds him again of his vow to revenge Horatio's death and identification of situation 
becomes identification of self : " ... all as one are our extremities" (1.92)- sympathy 
becomes empathy. Hallett and Hallett suggest that this is the culmination of "[t]he process 
by which the maddened Hieronimo projects his psyche onto the exterior world ..."(P-151). 
The identification with Bazulto seems to open Hieronimo's eyes to his own inadequacy in
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playing the role of loving father whose duty it is to revenge his son's murder; but more 
importantly, it contributes indirectly towards Hieronimo's metamorphosis from upright 
upholder of the law to murderous villain. The taking on of the villain's part is now more 
than skin deep, it is affected at the cost of Hieronimo's very soul: he pledges to obtain 
revenge neither through earthly judicial arbitration nor heavenly intervention but via the 
powers of hell (11.109-123). Don Bazulto thus plays an important role here - that of a 
formative image with which Hieronimo identifies; but like the identification a child makes 
at the mirror-stage, Hieronimo's identity is based on misrecognition. He perceives of 
himself as a father, like Don Bazulto, filled with grief at his son's murder ("No sir, it was 
my murdered son"). Identifying himself with the grieving father is true recognition on 
Hieronimo's part; however, this recognition becomes misplaced. While he identifies totally 
with Don Bazulto's grief, Hieronimo's subsequent actions are in reality, those of a cunning 
revenger waiting to strike whereas Don Bazulto is attempting to achieve legal recourse for 
the murder of his son. Having subsumed the role of grieving father, Don Bazulto ceases to 
exist momentarily, as it were, in Hieronimo's tortured psyche and this is why he 
subsequently mistakes him firstly for the ghost of Horatio, and following that, "a Fury ... 
sent from the empty kingdom of black night" When Don Bazulto reminds Hieronimo that 
he is a grieving man who has come to seek justice for his murdered son, Hieronimo appears 
to regain his perspective, and recognises Bazulto for what he is - merely the image of his 
own grief.
From this point onwards, Hieronimo seems to focus all his attention towards ensuring that 
his revenge is carried out. He makes amends with Lorenzo (3.15.130-167) and conspires 
with Bel-Imperia and introduces her into his plans (4.1.29-50); in other words, his identity 
and actions have now reached a harmonious unity. When Balthazar requests that he put up 
some form of entertainment for his father the Viceroy of Portugal, Hieronimo replies "Why 
then, I'll fit you" Barber (1988, p. 147) comments that this implies "I am joining in the 
games you play" - the victim has identified with the aggressor. All that remains is the play- 
within-the-play, the actual means by which Hieronimo (and Bel-Imperia) achieve their 
revenge.
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The final role Hieronimo plays is the orchestrator of the play-within-the-play, the clever 
and cunning villain who plots his crime with care and dissembling; so much so that his 
unsuspecting victims fall straight into his trap. He pays attention to detail to ensure that the 
audience will not suspect anything amiss until it is too late; for example as the author and 
director he distributes the parts to the respective actors, and decides that each of the parts 
be spoken in "unknown languages". This is to create a general atmosphere of confusion 
which serves perfectly to mask his actions; so successful is his staging that the King and the 
Viceroy are not aware that their respective sons have been stabbed to death during the 
course of the performance. Thus does Hieronimo control his play world so that the control 
he craved for in real life which denied him the justice he desired is finally returned to him 
in his role as the author of his revenge. This brief period of control however, does not go 
without a hitch. Hallet and Hallett point out that the multiple murders indicate that 
Hieronimo's plans go somewhat awry (p. 157). The two planned deaths "explode by a 
chain reaction into five" This mirrors the earlier crime, where the murder of Horatio led to 
Serberine being murdered by Pedringano, and Pedringano being executed for the murder of 
Serberine. In this manner Hieronimo's actions resemble closely that of his aggressor. The 
identification is complete. His long speech at the end of his play where he reveals all to his 
audience is intended to end with his own death. This would have been a fitting end to 
Hieronimo the villain as decided by Hieronimo, Knight Marshal to the King of Spain; a 
punishment befitting the crime of murder. However, he is denied that justice and the King 
attempts to force him to reveal why he has orchestrated this bloody tableau. Hieronimo 
nevertheless no longer has any need for earthly justice of which the King is a representative 
since he has achieved his own private revenge. Hence, he refuses to cooperate and stabs 
himself instead. His identity, in a sense, has come full circle.
In Antonio's Revenge we are confronted by not one but two revengers or victims. Hallett 
and Hallett suggest that the opposing responses of Pandulfo and Antonio illustrate the 
psychic division between reason and passion : in Antonio is embodied the impetus towards 
revenge while Pandulfo represents the drawing back or procrastination from it (1980, p. 
166). By splitting the revenger in two, which is what this division essentially accomplishes, 
Marston is able to examine the workings of the psyche in each respective area. Another 
area which benefits from this division is the conceptualisation of identity by externalising
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the functions of reason and revenge we can witness the interplay between the two as 
enacted by separate individuals which nevertheless act in unison at the end of the play to 
carry out the act of revenge. The implication which follows upon this view however is that 
Pandulfo embodies reason and stoical acceptance, while Antonio personifies the passion of 
revenge- and this may reduce the characters to mere caricatures instead of the realist 
characters they are, endowed with some degree of psychological depth. 
While it is a fact that Marston wrote his plays for performance by children's companies, 
this need not reduce the play to a mere parody of adult suffering, for Antonio's Revenge 
seriously probes the psychology of its main characters, and contains several shockingly 
violent and vicious images, most notably the murder of Julio. The actors' youth, which 
would achieve a visual distancing from real life (thus potentially decreasing the distress 
factor for the audience), may on the other hand have an even more startling effect, in that 
the incongruity of emotional suffering with youth paradoxically intensifies the sense of 
pathos.
Structurally, Antonio's Revenge differs from The Spanish Tragedy in that Marston devotes 
almost equal attention to the atrocities of the villain Piero and his subsequent downfall as 
to the figure of the main revenger, Antonio (Hallett and Hallett, 1980, p. 163). Piero is the 
first character to appear onstage after the Prologue, and he dominates 1.1 where his 
character gloats over the atrocities he has committed in his scheme of revenge against 
Andrugio. Sturgess (1997) states that Marston "certainly did not set out to write a two-part 
play but saw in the unresolvable elements of the first Antonio play the impulse towards a 
different kind of comi-tragic mix" (p. xvi). At the end of Antonio and Mellida, Piero and 
Andrugio are reconciled, and Piero gives his daughter Mellida to Andrugio's son Antonio 
in marriage, thereby uniting the two families. His entrance at the beginning of Antonio's 
Revenge is thus a startling contrast from the ending of the previous play, for he comes in 
"unbraced, his arms bare, smeared in blood, a poniard in one hand, bloody, and a torch in 
the other ..." (1.1, stage direction). He is elated with the crimes he has committed : "I can 
scarce coop triumphing vengeance up/ From bursting forth in braggart passion" and 
proceeds to reveal to his servant Strozzo the catalogue of his crimes, all the while 
demanding bouquets for his cunning and hypocrisy. As an opening, this scene of evil 
triumph and a murderer revelling in his bloody deeds prepares the spectator for more
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violence to follow, while advancing the plot from the previous play. It is shocking to 
witness such sheer joy in another person's suffering, as Piero demonstrates when informed 
by Strozzo that Maria, Andrugio's wife has most likely heard of her husband's death : "O 
let me swoon for joy! By heaven, I think/1 ha' said my prayers within this month at least,/1 
am so boundless happy" (1.1.101-102). It is even more disturbing that the villain here is the 
Duke of Venice, the most powerful political character in the play, and that he takes such 
pleasure in his revenge. Strozzo, who is barely allowed to speak by Piero's excited 
interruptions accentuates the quality of Piero's vitality. Piero's general bluster seems to 
suggest the release of suppressed emotion, in this case, hatred against Andrugio; but it 
could, perhaps, be attributed also to the aftermath of murder. Having established the 
villain's character, the spectator would expect that some dire retribution must surely befall 
Piero during the course of the play. More than that, the frequent mention of the words 
"revenge" and "vengeance" (Piero uses these words a total of nine times in the space of a 
hundred and ten lines) suggests the central concern of the play. Although Piero is not 
technically speaking the revenger in this play, his character as portrayed here is motivated 
by revenge. His excessive, unnecessarily violent response to what is relatively speaking a 
minor issue (that he and Andrugio were rivals for Maria but Andrugio was the more 
successful suitor) is an oblique comment on the nature of revenge: that it is 
disproportionate and destructive; thereby setting the tone for Antonio's Revenge.
In 1.2 Marston examines the various ways of displaying grief. A situation is established to 
ensure that the worst possible shock befalls the two victims of the villain Piero: standing 
before Mellida's window Antonio and Pandulfo are confronted with the bloody spectacle 
of Felice's corpse stabbed thick with wounds hanging from a cord. The shock is 
compounded when Piero appears, mouthing threats to kill Mellida for committing adultery 
with Felice on her wedding eve. Following immediately upon that, Piero's servant Strozzo 
enters with the news that Antonio's father, Andrugio, is dead. Throughout this Antonio is 
silent; aside from his impulsive "Dog, I will make thee eat thy vomit up,/ Which thou hast 
belched 'gainst taintless Mellida" (11.203, 204) he does not say anything until line 256. 
Felice's father Pandulfo also remains silent. Piero and Strozzo however, in feigning grief 
(11. 232-245) put up an elaborate show. Maria, upon learning of her husband Andrugio's 
death is overcome by shock and sorrow, and faints. Pandulfo's reaction to the sight of his
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dead son strung up at Mellida's window is a marked contrast to the rest. After the 
incredulous "Dead?" Pandulfo laughs. Antonio gives vent to his emotion (11. 261-267) and 
Alberto's attempts to pacify him are met with outpourings of grief, and vehement rejection. 
While Antonio vents his frustration on Alberto (11. 273-281) Pandulfo, by contrast keeps 
emotion in check, seeking release by laughter. Taken aback by this, Alberto attempts to 
elicit a more appropriate response from Pandulfo by commiserating : "He was the very 
hope of Italy,/ The blooming honour of your drooping age". When Alberto remarks again at 
the inappropriacy of Pandulfo's laughter, Pandulfo launches into a tirade against excessive 
displaying of grief, calling it "apish action, player-like". Certainly, by juxtaposing 
Antonio's passionate outbursts against the counterfeit sorrow of Piero and Strozzo a 
similarity may be noted, namely the hyperbolic nature of the rhetoric. This conveys a sense 
of artificiality and posturing towards the respective displays of passion. If we compare 
Piero's words from 11.217-234 with Antonio's words in 11.264-267 and 285-292 we note a 
similar essence of theatricality in the excessive portrayals of grief and outrage; the 
difference is that for Piero it is merely an act whereas Antonio's grief is real. This is why 
Dollimore (1984), in opposing Pandulfo's stoicism against Antonio's passion, comments 
that "it is the theatrical convention as well as the experience which is being repudiated: 
passion is a kind of dramatic posturing" (p. 32). It would appear that the theatrical display 
of grief must necessarily be passionate to convey the element of suffering; however, 
passion does not always lend the air of authenticity to grief.
Marston explores another dimension of role playing in human behaviour: the response to 
grief. While Antonio confronts grief directly and acknowledges its source ("My father 
dead, my love attaint of lust") Pandulfo, embodying the Stoic stance, represses grief and 
seeks refuge instead behind a series of rhetorical questions. He rationalises the situation as 
such: if his son were innocent then his soul would be blessed for being unjustly murdered; 
if on the other hand he were indeed guilty of the crime of which he had been accused then 
his death need not be lamented - either way, tears would not be in order. He seems to 
displace his grief by focusing not upon the death of Felice but on the appropriate response; 
nevertheless, he still needs release from the grief he undoubtedly feels, and this is why he 
laughs "ostentatiously" as Sturgess comments. His behaviour here suggests that he uses the 
role of stoical acceptance to come to terms with his loss; as such, his protestations to
46
Alberto come across as somewhat theatrical and hyperbolic - as do Antonio's. The probing 
of stoicism in opposition to passion as responses to loss and persecution as portrayed in this 
play suggests that neither response can successfully appease the psyche: Antonio's 
excessive passion results in madness while Pandulfo finds that he cannot keep up his stance 
of calm and dignified acceptance when faced with the physical sight of his dead son's 
body. In 1.2 the shock of seeing Felice's corpse strung up causes him to laugh in a 
somewhat hysterical fashion; however, he mouths the conventional stoic platitudes 
rejecting open displays of grief. However, when he has to beg Piero to release Felice's 
body so that his son may be given a burial Pandulfo finally gives way to tears in 2.1.88 at 
the possibility that Felice had been wrongfully killed; but his resolve is even stronger and 
he resists Piero's attempts to corrupt him. Piero's evil attempt here to convince Pandulfo 
that Antonio was responsible for his own father's death gives Pandulfo something 
extraneous to focus on and this is why he once again seeks refuge in his philosophy. The 
stoic resolve breaks in 4.2.69-75 when he finally acknowledges his loss:
Man will break out, despite philosophy. 
Why, all this while I ha' but played a part 
Like to some boy that acts a tragedy, 
Speaks burly words and raves out passion; 
But when he thinks upon his infant weakness, 
He droops his eye. I spake more than a god, 
Yet am less than a man.
The stoic stance was, in other words, as much a form of dramatic posturing as raw 
unrestrained grief, and this enabled Pandulfo to curb his emotion. By playing the role of the 
fool in 4.1, Antonio similarly forces himself to contain anger and outrage. When Pandulfo 
realises that playing the stoic role does not enable him to find peace within himself he 
resorts to the role of revenger instead.
Piero's scheming and manipulation are so successful that both Pandulfo and Antonio are 
soon relieved of the external components of identity. When he fails to corrupt Pandulfo, 
Piero uses his position to banish him instead : "Slave, I banish thee the town,/ Thy native
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seat of birth" (2.1.152,153). Pandulfo thus becomes a man without a home, a political non- 
entity. Using Strozzo as a false witness, Piero has Antonio blamed for the murder of 
Andrugio and defamation of Mellida, a legally punishable offence. To preserve himself 
from Piero's persecution, Antonio has to feign his own death and take on the disguise of 
fool. Antonio discards his own identity. In this way, the play demonstrates how individuals 
become alienated from their society and can only be reintegrated via revenge (Dollimore, 
1984, p. 29). In Antonio's case however, it is more than Piero's evil plotting which causes 
him to lose his identity - his own overwhelming grief results in madness. In 2.2 Alberto 
tries to persuade Antonio to set aside his grief (1. 40) and Antonio tries to comply (1. 41): 
however, when he reads in his book the exhortation to "endure with fortitude, despise grief, 
despise fortune", the incongruity of those platitudes when measured against his own grief 
and loss of status ("he that was never blessed/ With height of birth, fair expectation/ Of 
mounted fortunes, knows not what it is/ To be pitied object of the world") causes him to 
revert to self-pity. The chorus of sighs that follow upon Antonio's lamentations unite in his 
person when he says "Woe for me all; close all your woes in me,/ In me, Antonio!" (11. 69, 
70). While rejecting stoical philosophy, he identifies with the grief of the various 
lamentors. His grief is further compounded when he learns from Mellida that she is to be 
put to death; and that Piero, who pursues his life seeks his mother's hand in marriage. His 
identity has, in other words, been completely dismantled by Piero. Deprived of wife, father 
and mother, Antonio is bereft of family, an indicator of identity. The accumulation of all 
these shocks destabilises Antonio's psyche and this is why he descends into such inordinate 
grief.
The murder of Julio is symbolically a turning point for Antonio, as it initiates him into the 
role of revenger, giving him a new identity. This is supported by the fact that after 3.2 
Antonio no longer appears in public as himself but instead, adopts the disguise of fool. In 
3.2 all the grief and suppressed anger that Antonio has been accumulating finds release in a 
murder most noted for its excess. Admittedly, it occurs rather early on in the play and as 
such there has not been enough time for Antonio to effect a convincing transformation into 
the murdering revenger in the span of time between 2.2 and 3.2. The murder of Julio would 
thus be better viewed as an example of the excessive behaviour that can result from the 
overindulgence of passion, in this case, anger. In psychoanalytic terms, this murder
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demonstrates how the ego attempts to appease the id while conforming to reality. Antonio 
is filled with grief at his own fate, and thinks of death : "Tomb, I'll not be long / Ere I creep 
in thee, and with bloodless lips/ Kiss my cold father's cheek" (11. 13-15). The appearance of 
Andrugio's ghost marks the externalisation of the anger that has been welling up in 
Antonio which has had to be held in check because of Piero's power and Antonio's own 
lack ("Thou that wants power, with dissemblance fight"). In terms of plot, the ghost 
functions to reveal the truth to Antonio, that his father had been poisoned by Piero; it also 
instigates Antonio to revenge. As in Hamlet, the sighting of the ghost stirs up the desire for 
revenge within the revenger. While Hamlet pondered over the information given by his 
father's ghost, here Antonio springs to action and seizes the first opportunity he gets to be 
revenged on Piero. However, he does not attack Piero directly, opting for a more drawn out 
form of vengeance. Nevertheless, he must needs appease the intense anger he feels and 
seeks release in a substitute for Piero : his son Julio. It is clear that in Antonio's mind 
murdering Julio is akin to murdering Piero, as he states in line 178 ("It is not thee I hate, 
not thee I kill") and again in lines 200-202. In Antonio's mind Julio takes on his father's 
identity. By killing Julio Antonio appeases the demands of his id to be revenged on his 
enemy; by using Julio as a substitute, his ego postpones momentarily desire which can only 
be achieved by the destruction of Piero.
If it is true that Antonio embodies passion and Pandulfo reason, then Antonio's Revenge 
implies that neither faculty in its totality can offer a satisfactory mode of behaviour - the 
one because it is excessive and the other because it is too repressive. Following this line of 
thought, we may conclude that Marston viewed revenge as any other human endeavour 
requiring reason and passion in the process of its fufillment. Without passion, there can be 
no impetus; without reason, all endeavour lacks structure and coherence. Marston, by 
separating these two faculties into the bodies of two separate protagonists, is able to 
demonstrate the interplay which must lie between the two in order to achieve a common 
goal. It is this fascination with the conception of revenge, the pathology of grief and 
suffering which is at the heart of the play; the weighing of moral ambiguities, which 
absorbs our attention in The Spanish Tragedy and in Hamlet, is here of secondary 
importance. At risk of appearing reductive, it is nevertheless interesting to note that this 
division between reason and passion seems to correspond to Freud's division of the human
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psyche into the ego and id, with the id representing unbridled desire or passion and the ego 
(reason) as the mediating force which tempers the drives of the id:
The id of course knows no judgements of value: no good and evil, no morality. 
Instinctual cathexes seeking discharge-that, in our view, is all there is in the id... 
The ego controls the approaches to motility under the id's orders; but between a need 
and an action it has interposed a postponement in the form of the activity of thought... 
To adopt a popular mode of speaking, we might say that the ego stands for reason and 
good sense while the id stands for the untamed passions ... (The Dissection of the 
Psychical Personality, 1933, pp. 107-9)
Following this model, the revenge action represents the object-cathexis by which the ego 
attempts to recommend itself to the id, thereby diverting the id's libido on to itself; all this 
is in an attempt to substitute the reality principle for the pleasure principle. Passion 
demands that loss be avenged but reason dictates that murder and violence are not the 
solution. The ego appeases the id by identifying itself with the id's objects of desire: the act 
of revenge reflects the atrocities committed by the villain against his victims. The violent 
retribution which the id desires to befall the villain is eventually achieved. Thus, in 
Antonio's Revenge, reason gives way to passion and violence is committed. Unlike other 
revenge tragedies however, Marston's revengers do not meet with the usual, expected fate 
namely death. Nevertheless, they choose to spend the remainder of their lives "enclosed/ In 
holy verge of some religious order/ Most constant votaries". Thus they choose to live in 
social anonymity, known only as "the orphan of a murdered father" and "the father of a 
butchered son" (5.3.165,166). This is despite the fact that Galeazzo and the two senators in 
5.3 laud them for "ridding huge pollution from [their] state" and wish to reward them for 
disposing of Piero (5.3.138-140). Their refusal to accept society's recognition which is 
bestowed upon them for an essentially violent and merciless murder reflects the moral 
dilemma which the genre presents. The action of surrendering completely to unrestrained 
passion which is reflected in the excessive cruelty and violence displayed in the final act of 
vengeance renders the division between the ego and the id as no longer tenable: the whole 
psyche becomes a seething mass of passion devoid of the mitigating influence of reason. 
Society's response to the revengers further confuses the issue: if society functions as the 
conscience/ego ideal/ super-ego in this play then what we are presented with is a psyche
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which has given in to the urgings of the id while rejecting the moderating influence of the 
ego. The super-ego, whose function is to sublimate the desire of the ego and the id has 
ceased to function in such a society which attempts to reward individuals for murder. As 
metaphors for the psyche Antonio and Pandulfo have to reject the identity which society 
attempts to bestow upon them.
If in The Spanish Tragedy the notion of role-playing was shown to be the series of masks 
Hieronimo put on at different occasions befitting the social setting, role-playing for 
Antonio serves as a means to curb his overwhelming passion (4.1.38-59). Similarly, the 
role of stoical self-control adopted by Pandulfo enables him to restrain himself. While 
Maria, Alberto and Lucio doubt the effectiveness of his disguise Antonio embraces it with 
unbounded zeal, as it allows him licence to speak unpunished; but more importantly, taking 
on the role of fool forces Antonio to withhold his passion (4.1.67-70):
Now patience hoop my sides
With steeled ribs, lest I do burst my breast
With struggling passions. Now disguise stand bold.
Poor scorned habits oft choice souls enfold.
Antonio acknowledges the virtues of being born a fool in 4.1.38-49 and wishes that heaven 
had made him a senseless fool. Had he been born a fool he would not feel the anguish he 
presently feels at the calamities which have befallen him and would not be in his present 
position, plotting and conniving to commit murder. At the same time, the disguise allows 
him access to Piero's court since the Duke is in effect, out for his blood and his life is thus 
in danger if he should continue to exist as Antonio, son of Andrugio. Role-playing thus 
serves multiple functions which work to Antonio's advantage. To complete the 
transformation from his former identity, Antonio has to kill himself off: "Alberto, see you 
straight rumour me dead" (4.1.65). This unfortunately, results in Mellida's death. If we 
agree that identity depends not only on the self but also on the recognition bestowed upon 
the self by others, then Mellida is the last character to have acknowledged Antonio as he 
was (i.e. her husband) before Piero effectively extinguished his existence. For although 
Alberto and Maria acknowledge Antonio's continued existence as Antonio son of
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Andrugio, in order for Antonio's plot to succeed they can no longer do so publicly. The 
death of Mellida thus appears to complete the distancing from identity which Antonio has 
had to effect in order to achieve his desire. To regain identity Antonio and Pandulfo have 
had to repeat the evil plotting and carnage which the villain Piero used against them. Role- 
playing enables the revengers to achieve their revenge but once this has happened their 
respective roles are discarded. If suicide were not forbidden by Christianity they would 
have taken their own lives (5.3.146-149); since that is not permissible, the next best path is 
a life sequestered until death should claim them. By ending Antonio's Revenge in this way 
Marston comments upon the society for which morality is fluid. The revengers inflict 
punishment upon themselves while society attempts to reward them; reason is abandoned 
for passion momentarily until desire is achieved. Under such circumstances the individual 
determines his own identity and takes responsibility for his own actions. Role-playing is 
one of the means by which this is attained.
In 1.3 of The Revenger's Tragedy Vindice disguised as Piato asks his brother, "Am I far 
enough from myself?" His question here serves as a possible guide towards understanding 
Vindice's character. For although several critics consider Vindice to be a character in the 
Morality tradition, a "personified abstraction and moral or social type" whose "speeches 
reveal [his] world rather than [an] individual mind" (Salingar, 1986, p. 207) nevertheless as 
an example of the function of role play in creating identity, Vindice demonstrates how, by 
the taking on of a role, the individual recreates himself so that he is as far from himself as 
he can possibly be. As with the other revengers in this study, Vindice introjects 
characteristics of other characters in his environment to create a new self. He is however, 
unique in the sense that the character he introjects is not that of another revenger with 
whom he is planning the revenge, nor is it one of the villains in the plot. Rather, the 
villainous character with whom Vindice appears to identify is one created by the role 
which he takes upon himself in his disguise as Piato. Hall (1991), commenting on the 
character of Vindice, states that "... the play explores the destructive dynamics of role- 
playing as Vindice changes from a sensitive individual to the morally attenuated revenger" 
(p. 25) by means of the "[t]he bridge between his potential and actual character as revenger 
[which] is the persona of Piato" (p. 26). The role of Piato, according to Hall "serves as an 
alter ego, releasing the emotional attraction to vice that Vindice must repress and condemn
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in his character of traditional moralist" (ibid.). Hall's description of Vindice, however, 
implies that the character of traditional moralist is one that Vindice takes upon himself, 
and this curtails his penchant for vice; whereas the text shows his development (or 
regression) from moralist to villain-revenger to be the result of his losing himself (or 
perhaps even finding himself) in his role. The role, in other words, releases his destructive 
potential in that by assuming the role of Piato Vindice enables himself to succeed in his 
mission. Arguably, Vindice's success is aided as well by good fortune and the obtuseness 
of his enemies. The point though, is not so much the fact that Vindice succeeds in taking 
revenge on the Duke, but that in the process of so doing he demonstrates an increasing 
sense of enjoyment at the plotting and manipulation which accompanies his revenge. If we 
agree with Hall's suggestion of a doubleness in the character of Vindice, then it must be the 
enacting of the role of Piato, "the child o' the court", which liberates Vindice's skill for 
mischief-making.
In The Spanish Tragedy the psychic split within Hieronimo was between the public self and 
the private; in Antonio's Revenge Marston examines the psychic division between reason 
and passion with respect to revenge. Similarly, in The Revenger's Tragedy two facets of a 
character appear to be juxtaposed, namely the moralist and the villain revenger. To begin 
with, the moralist in Vindice is suppressed as he employs a discourse replete with vice and 
"fulsome lust" in his attempt to win Lussurioso's confidence, in his role as Piato. 1.3 
demonstrates how Vindice attempts to juggle himself between the two roles as he worms 
his way into Lussurioso's confidence. Vindice's shock and anguish at learning the identity 
of the lady upon whom Lussurioso has set his sights are conveyed in the aside "O, my 
sister, my sister!" (1. 123). The moralist is dismayed that his own sister is to be subjected to 
Lussurioso's lust, not in the estate of marriage but rather as a "friend", admitted to his bed 
by stealth (11. 103-105). Nevertheless, he succeeds in concealing his feelings (and true 
identity) from Lussurioso in a scene fraught with irony as he and the Duke's son pat each 
other on the back at having succeeded in making Castiza's own brother (Hippolito) into 
"the subtle instrument" which would now enable Piato "to entice and work his sister" 
Vindice gives vent to his anger in the speech at the end of the scene (11. 164-180), vowing 
to kill Lussurioso with his own sword. Once he has controlled his fury, however, he reveals 
a curious plan: to tempt his mother and his sister as if they were no kin to him, to the extent
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that he would "forget [his] nature", to see whether they would be able to resist his 
tempting. Although he states that he would stake his salvation on their virtue, his decision 
to play the devil's advocate here demonstrates an almost perverse desire to test the 
resilience of his own mother and sister, to see whether they live up to his expectations. It 
thus hints at a wish to control and to manipulate, and by extension, to create - what Foakes 
(1973) describes as Vindice the "'artist', the stage-manager and writer of his own playlets, 
becoming so absorbed in his skill that he treats life [and the people in his surroundings] 
merely as an exercise for his art ..." (p.29). This dimension of his character only comes to 
the fore once he successfully suppresses his moral side.
We are not given much insight into the character of Vindice prior to his taking on of the 
role of Piato, for Vindice decides to "quickly turn into another" as early as the end of 1.1. 
Freer (1981) however, charts Vindice's "psychological enlargement" by studying his verse 
throughout the play. He suggests that Vindice's opening speech displays an extreme 
nervousness of style and constant shift in focus which "convey[s] directly the character's 
manic instability" (p. 65). The verse technique here "gives an immediate impression of 
Vindice's tension and his tendency to aggravate the very thoughts that cause him the most 
pain" (p. 66). Certainly, the act of preserving the skull of one's beloved is by modem 
standards morbid to say the least. The role of memory in fuelling the desire for revenge is 
taken to the extreme in Vindice's case. Ellis-Fermor (1936) comments that the opening of 
the play functions simultaneously as prologue and self-revelation by the central figure, with 
Vindice "hoverfing] between a chorus and a participant in the play" (p. 36). She commends 
Toumeur [sic] for the artistic soundness of this scene, as it "set[s] to work a train of 
thought which will guide us in selecting and holding the main theme of the play" (ibid.). 
The opening scene thus fills the audience in on the salient details of the plot; more 
important than that, the first glimpse of Vindice presents a vindictive individual, filled with 
bitterness and a mind already committed to revenge. This portrayal truly befits the name 
given to the protagonist. Unlike the other revenge tragedies discussed thus far which 
examine the process by which the protagonist steels himself towards revenge, The 
Revenger's Tragedy narrows its focus and dissects the action of revenge, showing that in 
the process of accomplishing this "wilde justice" the revenger inevitably becomes as evil as 
the object of his revenge. This fact however, would not come as a surprise to the spectator;
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for in giving the revenger such a name as Vindice, Middleton (who is now generally 
acknowledged to be the author of the play) in essence preordains his character's fate, that 
he will embody vengeance in this play, and this is confirmed in the opening scene. By 
putting the words of the moralist in Vindice's lips as well however, Middleton 
problematizes the idea of the revenger's identity. For, as Prosser (1971) states: "According 
to ethics revengers are evil; according to theatrical tradition, evil men are ipso facto 
revengers (p. 39). If Vindice is truly evil and vindictive after all, as suggested by his name, 
then it can only mean that evil is more primary to his nature. At the same time, Vindice is 
deeply moral as well. This moral side, however, cannot withstand the onslaught brought 
about by the demands of his role, whether it be that of the bawd Piato or the revenger 
Vindice. We later leam that the crime committed by the Duke against Gloriana took place 
nine years before. It is therefore assumed that Vindice has spent the past nine years 
brooding on her death. Thus, when he first appears onstage he is already somewhat 
unbalanced; and this is reflected in his posture with the skull.
As with the other revenge tragedies, the action takes place within a corrupt court. 
However, Vindice is connected to the court in that his own brother Hippolito is a member 
of this same court which Vindice so detests ("But O, accursed palace!"). To some extent, 
Hippolito benefits from its lax morals, for he suggests in 1.1.62-63 that the Duchess's 
sexual interest in him may have kept him his job. There can thus be no simple Manichaean 
dichotomy which equates the court with the forces of evil. Nor can it be assumed that 
Vindice, as the revenger, will be the protagonist more sinned against than sinning. In 
volunteering himself for the "strange-digested fellow ... Of ill-contented nature" to pander 
for the duke's son, Vindice acknowledges the necessity to be "a man o' th' time" since "to 
be honest is not to be i' th' world" (1.1.94-95). His words display a worldly cynicism which 
is apparent in spite of the moralistic attitude demonstrated in his (earlier) opening speech. 
This suggests a rounder, more complex character than that of the moralist. Freer (1981) 
rightly points out that "to treat Vindice primarily as a moral commentator would be to 
move him into an area of discourse where large parts of his character development would 
be inaccessible" (p. 67), not to mention incomprehensible. Hence, there appears to be no 
moral touchstone in the world of this play. While Castiza demonstrates an incorruptible 
spirit, she nevertheless appears somewhat one-dimensional, merely the embodiment of the
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virtue of chastity when compared to Vindice. Vindice's own father is said to have been "a 
worthy gentleman" who died "Of discontent, the nobleman's consumption" The 
impression we get of Vindice's father is one of passive resistance; as such, if we consider 
this in the light of Vindice's spirited plea to "Vengeance" in his opening speech, clearly his 
father would not serve as a satisfactory identificatory model for Vindice. When Vindice 
says "I'll quickly turn into another" at the end of 1.1, he decides to forego his moral stance 
and assume the manner and morals of "a man o' th' time", which his father was not. By 
placing this brief description of Vindice's father just before this decision to take on 
another's appearance/character, a link is established between the two. While it is assumed 
that Vindice intends to revenge Gloriana's murder, it is also possible that the thought of 
avenging his father's death plays on his mind as well, since in 1.1.120-121 he mentions that 
he has been out of sorts since his father's funeral, and in 1.1.57 he remarks to Hippolito: 
"Thy wrongs and mine are for one scabbard fit"
In fact, we are never really certain as to why Vindice decides to take upon himself the role 
of revenger. If it was to revenge Gloriana's death at the hands of the Duke, then there is 
really no reason for Vindice to carry on destroying the remaining members of the Duke's 
family once the Duke has been poisoned in 3.5. This is one of the factors which perhaps 
contributes to critical opinion which views Vindice as a type, an allegorical figure in the 
Morality tradition. Certainly if we compare between Vindice and Hamlet we find that 
Vindice lacks a true motive for revenge, and that at the end of the day Vindice's revenge 
appears pointlessly excessive save that it rids the court of several immoral individuals. In 
addition, Vindice suffers none of the moral anxiety that Hamlet is subjected to. The 
decision to revenge is a given at the beginning of the play. Vindice has no moral misgivings 
about what he has decided to do, and this causes his character to be a contradiction; for, 
apart from his dedication to blood revenge, his views and attitudes towards life convey the 
impression of a very moral individual. This contradiction however, lends more depth to his 
character, for as Vindice dismisses the stance of worthy malcontent/moral commentator 
and takes on the role of "strange-composed fellow", he moves further and further away 
from his moral centre, to the point that he begins to enjoy the creative potential of his evil 
plotting.
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That Vindice is able to play his role as pander very well is demonstrated in the temptation 
scene, 2.1. While Castiza refuses to have anything to do with Piato and the message he 
brings her from Lussurioso, Gratiana by contrast is tempted by his persuasive speech (11. 
84-101) and replies "O heavens! This overcomes me." Vindice who knows about the 
disadvantages of poverty uses this as the basis of his argument to convince Gratiana. While 
he is shocked at how easily she is won, and says in an aside, "I e'en quake to proceed, my 
spirit turns edge! /1 fear me she's unmothered" he nevertheless decides " yet I'll venture" 
(11. 108-109, emphasis added)- which he does, almost as though he cannot resist pushing 
his role as tempter to the limit even though it might work to the moral detriment of his 
sister. When Gratiana is won over by his present of money, Vindice's remark ("O suff ring 
heaven .. turn the precious side / Of both mine eyeballs inward, not to see myself - 
emphasis added) suggests a sense of responsibility normally found in a deeply moral 
character : he does not condemn his mother's weakness, but instead, focuses on himself, as 
though taking the blame for her weakness which results from his success in corrupting her. 
His words here suggest that he cannot bear to reflect on himself in this role as purveyor of 
vice. Maus (1995) notes that "Vindice associates the inward turn of his eyeballs with an 
absence of self-reflection; suggesting that he characteristically acquires his moral bearings 
not by introspection but by observing the effects of his actions in the world" (p. 359). In 
addition, the context suggests that Vindice here relinquishes moral responsibility in playing 
the role of corrupter, as he chooses not to reflect on what he is doing. This line thus 
demonstrates that Vindice does have a moral side in that he can differentiate between right 
and wrong. He fears that his mother is on the verge of yielding to temptation (1. 109), and is 
dismayed at her weakness, as shown in his asides. However, he chooses to persist. It is as 
though the moral side fears for his mother and his sister, yet compelled by his role as Piato 
he ruthlessly proceeds. Gratiana states in 4.4.34 that "no tongue but yours [Vindice's] 
could have bewitched me so", a testimony to his powers of persuasion and ability to 
dissemble. We can only speculate that his success in winning the confidence of Lussurioso, 
coupled with the fact that his own mother and sister fail to see through his disguise, 
increases his confidence in his own role-playing skill and this, in turn, motivates him to 
more ingenious improvisation, as seen in 2.2 where he neatly side-steps Lussurioso's wish 
to an amorous encounter with Castiza by informing him that Spurio and his stepmother are 
engaged in incestuous activities.
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While Vindice's asides might serve as reminders to the audience that he is merely playing 
his role as Piato, they function to remind himself of the fact as well. When Castiza remarks 
in 2.1.171-172 that her mother's words would sound better coming from Piato's lips, 
Vindice says to himself "Faith, bad enough in both,/ Were I in earnest, as I'll seem no less" 
(emphasis added) - as though to remind himself that he is merely playing a role. His 
persistent asides, curiously, appear to egg him on further, even as they reassure him that he 
is merely pretending to be the evil character he is portraying. His words and his deeds 
convey an ambivalent attitude: on the one hand, he wants to play his role convincingly yet 
on the other, at this point he is almost unable, as it were, to accept himself in such a role. 
Although Vindice has stated in 1.3.171-180 that some other person might have been called 
upon to perform his office in which case it would be far better for him to carry out the test 
upon his family himself as presumably, they would be in no real danger since he would be 
merely pretending and not really pandering for Lussurioso, the extent to which he goes in 
performing his role demonstrates a single-minded commitment to role-playing which 
surpasses the constraints of love for the family. It is perhaps in this way that he placates his 
conscience, in that by playing devil's advocate he is really working to ensure the safe- 
guarding of his sister's virtue. The implication of all this however points to the conclusion 
that Vindice is not as averse to vice as his moral side would make him out to be. The 
temptation scene thus presents Vindice vacillating between the evil, cunning exterior and 
the moralistic core as the demands of his role take him over, to the point where, having 
played his role to great success, he begins to revel in his own evil plotting and scheming by 
which point the moralist is no longer apparent.
By the time we see Vindice again after he has managed to bring about Lussurioso's 
imprisonment, he is somewhat changed. In 3.5 he demonstrates none of the misgivings of 
the moralist compelled to committing evil but instead, exhibits pure joy and excited 
anticipation at his ingenious plot for revenge on the Duke ("O sweet, delectable, rare, 
happy, ravishing!") Indeed, it is a plot which will ensure that the Duke's final moments are 
most painful and humiliating, for not only will he be poisoned from the "lips" of the skull 
of Gloriana whom he poisoned nine years ago, he will also witness his wife, the duchess, 
committing incest with his bastard son, the sight of which "will kill his eyes." Although on
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the verge of achieving his long desired revenge, Vindice's meditations here do not focus on 
the atrocities he is about to commit, except to gloat over his creative genius in dressing up 
Gloriana's skull to resemble a lady. The sight of the skull nevertheless, prompts Vindice's 
moralistic ruminations from 11. 68 until 97. The manner in which he contemplates the skull 
does not suggest in any way that it belongs to the woman he once loved. Instead, he appears 
capable only of focusing on how it could serve as a reminder of the eventual fate which 
awaits all man. According to Vindice the sight of the skull would cause those who beheld it 
to refrain from vice. The skull, in other words, becomes for him a useful implement to 
incite fear and the abstinence from vice, for "'twould fright the sinner/ And make him a 
good coward, put a reveller / Out of his antic amble" This self-righteous preoccupation 
with evil is in fact consistent with his portrayal of the moralist. However, it also 
demonstrates the almost puritanical narrowing of the mind first noticed in the opening 
speech, as Vindice shuns beauty and human goodness. Here, as in 1.1 Vindice measures 
Gloriana's beauty in terms of the corrupting effect it would have on men who beheld her. It 
would appear that to his twisted, decaying mind a woman's beauty is capable only of 
provoking men to vice; women can only be chaste when they are dead and their beauty has 
been consumed by worms. This inability to find anything of value in beauty reflects a 
rejection of normal human interaction for a corresponding increase in self-absorption. This 
self-absorption however, does not include self-reflection, for the issues Vindice ponders 
upon while addressing the skull are far removed from his immediate situation. In 
contemplating the general depravity of the human condition specifically with respect to lust 
and lechery, Vindice gives final voice to the moralist, concluding that " ... we are all mad 
people, and they /Whom we think are, are not" (3.5.79-80).
Freer (1981) suggests that in his speeches in 3.5 "Vindice's identification of himself as a 
corrupt character is complete" (p. 79). In this scene we see for the first time, Vindice 
proclaiming confidently, even proudly, his real identity to the Duke: '"Tis I, 'tis Vindice, 
'tis I." Coincidentally, after this scene Vindice no longer needs to appear in his disguise as 
Piato but can resume his own identity as Vindice; of this fact we are reminded thrice in 4.2 
(11. 1,32 and 170). Hall (1991) confirms this: "Now [Vindice] no longer needs to resort to a 
disguise. He has only ... to 'turn myself to furnish the 'villain' that Lussurioso is 
seeking..." (p 29). While this comes about due to the development in the plot, it is
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nevertheless very suggestive of the development in Vindice's character as well. Having 
murdered the Duke in a most cruel and violent manner, Vindice appears to have liberated 
himself from the strictures of the moralist. Freer points out the appropriate means by which 
Toumeur [sic] ends the life of one villain only to resurrect another : "The poisoned kiss is 
an apt means for the revenge because it literally eats the Duke; ... [the corrosive] is equally 
suited to Vindice, who has been practicing [sic] his own gradual self-disintegration" (p. 
85). This self-disintegration is the substitution of the villain-revenger for the moralist.
This brings us inevitably to the issue of Middleton's choice of name for his revenger. After 
the murder of the Duke Vindice reconstitutes his identity as the revenger . '"Tis I, 'tis 
Vindice, 'tis I" It almost seems as though the playwright forces this identity upon the 
revenger; for as had been shown earlier, Vindice is not simply a one-dimensional 
embodiment of vengeance. Yet, he has no choice but to be revenge. Thus, Vindice is 
essentially deprived of the option of following his moral side. When Lussurioso remarks on 
his name in 4.2, Vindice reaffirms his identity : "Aye, a revenger." True to his words, he 
demonstrates a glee and enjoyment in his mission which seems designed to arouse the 
spectator's revulsion. 3.5 shows Vindice at his most sadistic as he tortures the Duke before 
killing him. It is not only the action of murder which chills the spectator, it is the 
corresponding lack of contrition on the part of the revengers. It is thus no wonder that Eliot 
(1964) remarks : "[The Revenger's Tragedy] does express ... an intense and unique and 
horrible vision of life" (p. 128). This horrible vision of life nevertheless offers an interesting 
perspective on role playing and its effect on identity as witnessed in the character of 
Vindice. When forced to adopt an identity which conflicts with one's nature (as when 
Vindice takes on the role of the corrupt Piato which is at odds with his moral nature) the 
strain can push the psyche to the other extreme, so that it comes to embrace fully the alter 
ego. The role in other words is assimilated. As a form of defence however, the individual 
distances him/herself from what he/she has become. In Vindice's case, he assumes a grimly 
satirical attitude as in 5.1.3-5 when he is engaged by Lussurioso to kill Piato "Brother, 
that's I; that sits for me; do you mark it? And I must stand ready here to make away myself 
yonder. I must sit to be killed, and stand to kill myself." Similarly, when condemned to 
death at the end of the play Vindice displays no remorse nor regret and even seems to 
embrace death : "We have enough,/1' faith, we're well: our mother turned, our sister true/
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We die after a nest of dukes adieu." He seems almost relieved to bring his character to a 
close; however, he goes to his death very much as Vindice the revenger although this time 
he appears to turn his vengeance upon himself. For he states: '"Tis time to die, when we 
are ourselves our foes" - poetic justice for being unable to keep his mouth shut.
While there may be truth to the contention that "The Revenger's Tragedy emphasizes the 
artificiality, even the silliness of many of the familiar procedures of English revenge 
tragedy" (Maus, 1995, p. xxi), it is nevertheless still possible to examine Vindice as a 
psychological character in his own right, even though to some critics he comes across as 
"frankly artificial" (Bradbrook, 1935, p 166). This supposedly unrealistic portrayal of 
character results from the attempt to reconcile two opposing attitudes within one character, 
the plausibility of which should nevertheless not be ruled out given the circumstances 
under which the character in question is placed. In fact, the theatrical nature of Vindice's 
character is in itself an oblique comment on the nature of revenge, as are the elaborate and 
ingenious plots Vindice hatches to achieve his goal. The nature of the plot which contains 
in it several related sub-plots, all pertaining to revenge in some form or the other reflect the 
quality of Vindice's mind which we are later told in 4.2 is in fact in a state of melancholy 
and discontent, having been brooding on vengeance for nine years. A mind which has been 
thus occupied for nine years is likely to be disorientated, no longer able to differentiate 
between itself and the object of its melancholia. Unlike the melancholic Freud describes in 
the paper Mourning and Melancholia (1917) however, Vindice is not given to self- 
reproaches. He has very specific objects against which he directs his railings, and these 
objects are very much external to himself, at least in the physical sense: the Duke, the 
Duke's son, the Duke's bastard, the "accursed palace" Vindice's melancholia too, does not 
focus on the object he has lost, namely Gloriana. This leads back to the question as to 
whether her death is really what leads Vindice to plan this elaborate revenge in the first 
place, or whether she is merely the excuse he needs to unleash his vicious and violent side.
While the other revenge plots within the play reinforce the notion of the ludicrous potential 
of the revenge genre, they detract somewhat from the character of the protagonist since he 
is not directly involved in the other sub-plots. Nevertheless, it is possible to chart the 
progress of Vindice's character as he determines "to turn into another", and thus moves
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further and further away from himself. The other that he becomes, however, is not the 
revenger per se but the vicious villain as well. It is only after he has killed the Duke that he 
reverts to his own name and identity: as Hippolito remarks in 4.2.1: "So, so , all's as it 
should be; y'are yourself." Vindice's character thus moves from moralist-malcontent to 
pander to revenger to villain-revenger, with the corresponding changes in name: Vindice, 
Piato, Vindice, Vindice. The plot reflects ingeniously the substitution of one facet of 
Vindice's character for another, as Lussurioso employs Vindice/Piato to prostitute his own 
sister, then later employs Vindice himself to kill Piato. While it is Lussurioso who 
unwittingly enables Vindice to undergo the ensuing metamorphosis, it is Vindice himself 
who uses all his creative powers to become the character(s) he sets out pretending to be. 
For example, in his first encounter with Lussurioso in his disguise as Piato, Lussurioso is 
clearly taken aback at the "grossly indecorous language and behaviour" exhibited by 
Vindice which, although a calculated attempt to convince Lussurioso of Piato's unsavoury 
character nevertheless demonstrates an extreme stance to adopt, the attitude of one who 
takes his villainy to extremes. This is characteristic of Vindice who identifies so 
completely with the evil characters he plays that it undermines his identity; so much so that 
we never know which one of the various faces he puts on is the true Vindice.
To talk about a 'true' Vindice however, is an attempt to essentialise his character, to pin 
him down and label him with an authority which does not exist in the text. Possibly after 
all this dissembling Vindice himself no longer knows who Vindice is, except to 
acknowledge that he is the one who murdered the Duke and Lussurioso. There are two 
instances in the play when Vindice speaks his name to identify himself: when he is killing 
the Duke and when he kills Lussurioso. It would appear that it is in the act of murder that 
he reaffirms his identity: as villain. At the end of the play, Vindice again identifies himself 
(and Hippolito) as the murderers of Lussurioso. In a sense therefore, Vindice essentialises 
himself, in an attempt to bring the self to a close, to use McMillin's expression (1984, p. 
277). This attempt, however, is based on misrecognition, for Vindice is not merely the 
villain-revenger. The fact that he needs to first put on the disguise of Piato to release his 
evil potential implies that evil is not second-nature to him. That the potential for villainy is 
released by looking within rather than by identifying with someone specific in his present 
surroundings however, indicates that Vindice's "mirror stage" must have occurred prior to
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the decision to turn revenger. Who supplied the image with which Vindice identified? 
Since he has been observing the goings-on in the Duke's court for nine years and knows 
enough about its corrupt ways to conclude that "to be honest is not to be i' th' world", it is 
not unreasonable to assume that Piato is based on Vindice's observations of corrupt 
courtiers. Having been thus observing the court for so long it is not surprising that Vindice 
introjects characteristics of its members. This explains why he is able to play his role so 
well. Using this line of reasoning, it is also possible to explain why Vindice's melancholia 
does not appear to have an object of focus, namely Gloriana, but instead festers on the 
corruptive effect she had on those who beheld her. It is because he broods not so much over 
her death as over what she has come to represent in his mind- the transcience of beauty (or 
by extension, anything good and pure) which is tainted once the court exerts its corrupting 
influence. Whether he associates the court with evil and corruption because of what the 
Duke did to her or whether her murder served only to reinforce a hatred already present we 
will never know because the text does not allow us to find out. What the text does show is 
that it is through the taking on of the role of Piato that Vindice is able to commit to 
villainy. By identifying with that which he despises, the child o' th' court, Vindice releases 




In his study on the link between role playing and identity in theatre, Wilshire (1982) 
examines Hamlet and suggests that Hamlet is drawn to the theatre because he hopes that 
it can eventually teach him to play his part, to carry out revenge against Claudius as 
demanded by his father's ghost (p. 71). In this project, the protagonists are, like Hamlet, 
displaced from access to control and authority. Two of the revengers previously occupied 
positions of (relative) autonomy: Hieronimo was the Knight Marshal, dispenser of justice 
while Antonio was the son of the Duke of Genoa. Vindice, we are given to understand, is 
socially dislocated probably due to poverty and his contempt for the ways of the court 
(and the Duke). Thrown unexpectedly into the position of revenger, each lacks initially a 
mimetic model upon whom to fashion himself so as to enable vengeance to be achieved. 
The identity each revenger possessed (Knight Marshal, proud father; son of a Duke, 
prospective bridegroom; morally upright individual) prior to the wrong committed 
against his loved one is no longer tenable. Each has to reconstruct identity before he can 
act, and role-playing appears to be one of the means by which each individual protagonist 
fulfills his need. Contrary to the initial hypothesis at the outset of this project however, 
the protagonists in the plays examined achieve the authorization they need in order to 
become revengers not from religious doctrine, nor from characters in similar 
circumstances- but from the villains themselves. Identity creation (ego formation) in this 
case is thus modelled on the protagonists' (corruptive)surroundings rather than on some 
ego-ideal, as had been proposed by Freud.
Viewed in these terms then, there would appear to be some truth to Freud's theory of the 
innate death drive in man. However, contrary to Freud's theory, the death drive as 
perceived in these plays is not a primordial instinct in which case the organism is 
propelled to seek its own destruction; rather it arises as a response to external factors 
which are beyond the individual's control. To paraphrase Freud's theory: the ego as the 
mediator between internal desire and external reality must perform a kind of balancing 
act, on the one hand attempting to appease the id while on the other appearing to conform 
to external reality to enable the individual to survive in the real world. The death drive in
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this case takes the form of the unbound desires of the id which threaten the unity of the 
ego. Although Freud, with his tendency to biologize, largely overlooks the moral 
dimension, this cannot detract from the question of choice, moral or religious, which 
confronts the protagonists. While an attempt has been made to deal with the revengers as 
though they were characters in their own right, it has not been possible to ignore at the 
same time the personal vision of the respective playwrights. For although the analysis 
attempted in this project works for revengers moulded on what Bowers (1940) terms "the 
school of Kyd" (and indeed the plays selected here all fall within this same category for 
precisely that reason), it cannot pretend to such success with all revenge tragedy, notably 
the anti-revenge plays such as The Revenge of Bussy D 'Ambois and The Atheist's 
Tragedy.
While Dollimore, displaying almost Freudian pessimism, shows that Jacobean tragedy 
disintegrates the notion of the transcendent subject (albeit without recourse to 
psychoanalytic theory), this project has attempted to "[put] the ghost back into the 
machine of decentered self to borrow a quote from Michael Neill, by examining the 
characters as individual psyches first and foremost before looking outwards. This perhaps 
explains why the analysis may not work for all revenge tragedy but can possibly be 
applied with some success to plays where the playwright seems to pay attention to the 
psychology of his characters, or at least, displays some interest in that direction. Although 
my response to the two anti-revenge plays mentioned above is of necessity only cursory, 
the general impression I am left with is that Chapman and Tourneur each had their own 
agenda in writing their versions of the genre, namely to convey their own moral reactions 
to the convention. As such, the revengers in these two plays seem to serve more as 
mouthpieces for their authors, propagating the virtuous response to loss in the case of 
Chapman, and the reward of (Christian) patience in the face of villainy which leaves 
revenge "[t]o whom the justice of revenge belongs" in the case of Tourneur's 
Charlemont. Both plays present the respective playwright's perceived alternative to the 
blood thirsty revenger of the (earlier) revenge plays. Bowers (1940) speculates : "It is 
possible that Tourneur ... was in this play [The Atheist's Tragedy] a reformer and 
moralist and that he was writing a propaganda tragedy with a religious hero and a higher
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moral to compete with the traditional amoral revenge play ..." (p. 143). Thus, if revenge 
tragedy is viewed as an insidious subversion of the accepted ideological status quo, then 
these anti-revenge plays subvert the subverted in rendering their revengers unwilling to 
revenge- thereby restoring or perhaps even reinforcing the (accepted?) order of the day.
While no one can say with absolute authority what triggered the "self-conscious anxiety" 
noted in drama (especially tragedy) of the late Elizabethan/Jacobean period, several 
critics have attempted to explain the phenomenon. One of the more popular arguments 
contends that the Elizabethans "... were born and lived in an age where the old universal 
faiths were no longer tenable in their traditional forms ... before new ones [faiths] had 
been fully formulated and established to take their place" (Hiram Haydn, quoted in Clay, 
1974, p. 2). Ornstein (1965) attributes the "crisis" to epistemological concerns, where the 
death of the "Elizabethan World Picture" slowly defaulted to the scientific because it 
could no longer appease an age eager for empirical and utilitarian knowledge (p. 4). More 
specific to the topic at hand, Hallett and Hallett (1980) suggest that revenge tragedies 
probe beyond the individual, personal anger and "investigate the whole question of 
justice and order in a society that is experiencing a civilizational crisis" (p. 120). The 
revenger, in his state of disillusion with the concept of justice, thus became a figure with 
whom the Elizabethans could relate because they themselves were experiencing a similar 
epistemic crisis. Collins (1989) reads Shakespeare's plays as dramatisation of the 
problem of order: "What is being sought is not absolute truth, as being, but order and 
meaning as becoming" (p. 13). His plays thus "[explore] Tudor ideals as expressions of 
human desire, a part of historical process rather than its authorized explanation" (Levao, 
quoted in Collins, p. 41). Given that most critics acknowledge Shakespeare's influence 
on the drama of his contemporaries it stands to reason that they (Shakespeare's 
contemporaries) too attempted to explore similar concerns in their drama.
In examining revenge tragedy, there can be no denying the formative influence which 
Shakespeare's Hamlet had on later plays of the genre. While The Spanish Tragedy, the 
earliest revenge drama served as a model for those which came later, Hamlet's 
contemplative spirit seems to have affected later revenge plays; so that while the
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identifying elements of the genre were still present, the motif (or even motive) of revenge 
is largely subordinated to other concerns. An interesting development is the focus of 
attention turning towards the villain rather than the revenger: almost as though the other 
playwrights concede that no revenger could live up to the precedent set by Hamlet, 
thereby necessitating a change in focus. While The Revenger's Tragedy does pay heed to 
the development of the revenger Vindice, his increasing villainy draws the attention away 
from the initial wrong committed against him, so that he holds our interest more as a 
villainous figure than as a revenger. In The Atheist's Tragedy D'Amville's presence is 
felt throughout the play and the final scene in court which culminates in the accident with 
the axe which kills him easily steals the thunder from Charlemont, the revenger; in The 
Changeling, one could be forgiven for failing to even notice the presence of the figure of 
the revenger in Tomazo for he effectively does nothing to procure vengeance- instead, 
Beatrice, the villain has to pay for her crime with her honour and the humiliation of being 
beholden to Deflores whom she detests. It is in this manner that vengeance is exacted, by 
circumstance rather than by design. Critics however, do not dispute Hamlefs influence 
on the development of tragedy. In taking the idea of revenge beyond the confines of the 
need to repay blood with blood, Hamlet "is less a tragedy than a frame and a stimulus for 
the creation of tragedies ... [as] Shakespeare uses an array of standard Renaissance tragic 
conflicts- mortality against ambition, Christianity against revenge, love against sexual 
horror, private truths against political imperatives- to compel a deep, sympathetic 
recognition of the way cultural contradictions agonize the sensitive individual"(Watson, 
1990, p. 325). Using the framework of revenge tragedy, Shakespeare draws attention to 
the conflicts facing an individual in a world so morally ambiguous that "There is nothing 
either good or bad but thinking makes it so" This brings us back to the question of 
revenge tragedy and psychoanalytical theory, how (and if) the one can illuminate the 
other.
While this project has largely concentrated on the individual revenger in reading the 
revenge plays in the hope of gaining some insight into the question of identity formation, 
it has to be conceded that this technique works well for some revenge plays, but not all. 
This is probably due to the fact that not all revenge plays have their center in the psyche
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of the revenger. Nevertheless, as "a reflection on experience and not just a reflection of 
it" (Hattaway, 1990, p. 93, his emphasis) this existence of a group of plays in the revenge 
tradition which quite clearly explores the fluid nature of identity confirms that the 
"problematic of the ego" was not unique to the age of Freud alone. In fact, Freud has 
reiterated that he was not the first to discover the unconscious (of which the ego is an off- 
shoot), an honour which he bestows to poets and philosophers before his time. This 
project would appear to confirm that as fact. At the same time, reading revenge tragedy 
(or for that matter, any piece of literature) as a reflection on the concerns of the age has 
suggested that Freud's writing may benefit from a similarly contextualized reading. By 
this I do not mean that his essays be read as a reflection of his own personal history but 
rather that they be viewed as Freud's reflections on the human psyche in relation to 
history at the time of the writing of the essays. Inasmuch as Jacobean drama is said to 
give voice to the general anxiety of the age so Freud's study of the mind may reflect the 
concerns of his age.
68
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(Note: Where two dates appear, the first refers to the original publication date of the work 
in question, while the second refers to the edition consulted in the writing of this thesis. For 
entries on Freud's essays the dates of the original German publications are given first, within 
square brackets.)
Abrams, M.H. A Glossary of Literary Terms. Orlando. Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich,
1993. 
Anonymous. 'The Revenger's Tragedy" In Four Revenge Tragedies. Ed Katharine
Eisaman Maus. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 93-173 
Aristotle. Poetics. Trans. Malcolm Heath. London: Penguin Books, 1996. 
Bate, Jonathan (ed.). Titus Andronicm. London: Routledge, 1995. 
Belsey, Catherine. The Subject of Tragedy. London: Methuen, 1985.
- - -. Desire. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.
Bloom, Harold. The Western Canon. London: Papermac, 1996.
Boothby, Richard. Death and Desire: Psychoanalytic Theory in Lacan 's Return to Freud.
New York: Routledge, 1991.
Borch-Jacobsen, Mikkel. The Freudian Subject. London: Macmillan, 1989.
Bowers, Fredson. Elizabethan Revenge Tragedy. 1940. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1966. 
Bradbrook, M.C. The Living Monument: Shakespeare and the Theatre of his Time. 1976.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- - -. Themes and Conventions of Elizabethan Tragedy. 1935. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979. 
Braunmuller, A.R. "The Arts of the Dramatist". In The Cambridge Companion to English
Renaissance Drama. Eds. A.R. Braunmuller and Michael Hattaway. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990. 53-90. 
Braunmuller, A.R. and Michael Hattaway (eds.). The Cambridge Companion to English
Renaissance Drama. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
69
Brooks, Peter. "Freud's Masterplot." In Literature and Psychoanalysis, the Question of 
Reading Otherwise. 1977. Ed. Shoshana Felman. Baltimore and London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1989. 280-300.
- - - "The Idea of a Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism." In Discourse in Psychoanalysis 
and Literature. Ed. Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan. London & New York: Methuen, 1987. 1-18. 
Brown, Norman O. Life Against Death : The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History. 
Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1959. 
Chapman, George. "The Revenge of Bussy D'Ambois". In Four Revenge Tragedies. Ed.
Katharine Eisaman Maus. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
175-248.
Clay, Charlotte N. The Role of Anxiety in English Tragedy: 1580-1642. Salzburg: Salzburg 
Studies in English Literature, 1974. 
Collins, Stephen L. From Divine Cosmos to Sovereign State: An Intellectual History of
Consciousness and the Idea of Order in Renaissance England. New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
Dollimore, Jonathan. Radical Tragedy. 1984. 2nd. Edition. Hertfordshire: Prentice Hall
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989.
- - "Desire is Death." In Subject and Object in Renaissance Culture. Ed. Margreta de 
Grazia et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 369-386. 
Eliot, T.S. Elizabethan Essays. New York: Haskell House, 1964. 
Elliott, Anthony. Social Theory and Psychoanalysis in Transition. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
- - - Psychoanalytic Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.
Ellis-Fermor, U.M. The Jacobean Drama. 1936. /*. Ed.. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 
1977
- - - The Frontiers of Drama. 1945. London: Methuen and Co., 1964. 
Ellman, Maud, (ed.) Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism. Harlow: Longman, 1994. 
Feldstein, Richard and Henry Sussman. (eds.) Psychoanalysis and... London: Routledge,
1990.
Feldstein, R. et al (eds.) Reading Seminars I and II. Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1996.
Felman Shoshana. "To Open the Question" In. Literature and Psychoanalysis, the
Question of Reading Otherwise. 1977. Ed. Shoshana Felman. Baltimore and
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. 5-10.
70
Fenichel, Otto. "Critique of the Death Instinct". 1935. In The Collected Papers of Otto
Fenichel. Ed. Hanna Fenichel and David Rapaport. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1954. 363-372.
Foakes, R.A. "The Art of Cruelty: Hamlet and Vindice." In Shakespeare Survey 26. 1973. 
21-31.
Freer, Cobum. The Poetics of Jacobean Drama. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1981.
Freud, Sigmund. "The Dissection of the Psychical Personality." [1933] Trans. James
Strachey. In Vol. 2: New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis of The Penguin 
Freud Library. Eds. Angela Richards and Albert Dickson. London: Penguin Books 
Ltd., 1991. 88-112.
- - ."Beyond the Pleasure Principle." [1920] Trans. James Strachey. In Vol. 11. On
Metapsychology of The Penguin Freud Library. Eds. Angela Richards and Albert 
Dickson. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1991. 275-338.
- - - "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning." [1911] Trans. James
Strachey. In The Penguin Freud Library, vol. 11:35-44.
"Instincts and their Vicissitudes." [1915a] Trans. James Strachey. In The Penguin 
Freud Library, vol. 11:113 -13 8.
- - - "Mourning and Melancholia." [1917] Trans. James Strachey. In The Penguin Freud 
Library, vol. 11:245-268.
- - - "On Narcissism: An Introduction." [1914] Trans. James Strachey. In The Penguin 
Freud Library, vol. 11:65-97.
- - -."Repression." [19156] Trans. James Strachey. In The Penguin Freud Library, 
vol.ll:145-158.
- - -."Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence." [1940] Trans. James Strachey. In 
The Penguin Freud Library, vol. 11:461-464.
- - - "The Ego and the Id." [1923] Trans. James Strachey. In The Penguin Freud Library, 
vol. 11:341-407.
- - - "The Unconscious." [191 5c] Trans. James Strachey. In The Penguin Freud Library, 
vol.11:159-222.
- - -."Civilization and its Discontents." [1930] Trans. James Strachey. In Vol.12.
Civilization, Society and Religion of The Penguin Freud Library. Eds. Angela 
Richards and Albert Dickson. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1991. 245-340.
71
. "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego." [1921] Trans. James Strachey. In
The Penguin Freud Library vol. 12:95-178 
- - - 'Psychopathic Characters on the Stage." [1942] Trans. James Strachey. In Vol. 14:
Art and Literature of The Penguin Freud Library. Eds. Angela Richards and Albert
Dickson. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1990.119-127. 
Gay, Peter (ed.). The Freud Reader. London: Vintage, 1995.
Hall, Joan Lord. The Dynamics of Role-Playing in Jacobean Tragedy. London: Macmillan, 
1991.
Hallett, Charles A. and Elaine S. Hallett. The Revenger's Madness. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1980.
Hattaway, Michael. "Drama and Society" In The Cambridge Companion to English
Renaissance Drama. Eds. A.R. Braunmuller and Michael Hattaway. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990. 91-126. 
Heath, Malcolm. Introduction. Poetics. By Aristotle. London: Penguin Books, 1996. vii-
Ixxi.
Hibbard, G.R. (ed.). Hamlet. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Hill, Christopher. The Century of Revolution 1603-1714 (2nded.). London: Routledge,
1993.
Hunter, G.K. "English Folly and Italian Vice: the moral landscape of John Marston." In 
Jacobean Theatre. Eds. John Russell Brown and Bernard Harris. London:
Edward Arnold Ltd., 1960. 85-111. 
Hurstfield, Joel. "The Politics of Corruption in Shakespeare's England." In Shakespeare
Survey 28. 1975. 15-28.
- - -. "The Historical and Social Background." In ,4 New Companion to
Shakespeare Studies. Eds. Kenneth Muir and S. Schoenbaum. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1971. 168-197.
Jenkins, Harold (ed.). Hamlet. London and New York: Routledge, 1994. 
Julien, Philippe. Jacques Lacan 's Return to Freud. New York: New York University Press,
1994.
Kernan, Alvin. "The Entrance to Hell: The New Tragedy." In The Revels History of Drama
In English Vol. Ill 1576-1613. Eds. Clifford Leech and T.W. Craik. London: Methuen &
Co. Ltd., 1975. 346-403.
Kerrigan, John. Revenge Tragedy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
72
King, Bruce. Seventeenth Century English Literature. London: Macmillan, 1982. 
Kishlansky, Mark. A Monarchy Transformed Britain 1603-1714. London: Penguin Books, 
1996.
Kyd, Thomas. "The Spanish Tragedy" In Four Revenge Tragedies. Ed. Katharine Eisaman
Maus. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 1-91. 
Lacan, Jacques. Ecrits: A Selection. 1977. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Routledge, 1997. 
Laplanche, Jean. Life and Death in Psychoanalysis. Trans. Jeffrey Mehlman. Baltimore and
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. 
Laplanche, J. and J.-B. Pontalis. The Language of Psychoanalysis. 1980. London: The
Hogarth Press, 1983.
Lever, J.W. The Tragedy of State. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1971. 
Lloyd, Peter. Perspectives and Identities: The Elizabethan Writer's Search To Know His 
World London. The Rubicon Press, 1989.
MacCannell, Juliet Flower. Figuring Lacan. London: Croom Helm, 1986. 
Mandel, Oscar. A Definition of Tragedy. New York: New York University Press, 1961. 
Marston, John. "Antonio and Mellida" In The Malcontent and Other Plays. Ed. Keith
Sturgess. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 1-55. 
-. "Antonio's Revenge" In The Malcontent and Other Plays. Ed. Keith Sturgess.
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 57-116. 
- - "The Malcontent" In The Malcontent and Other Plays. Ed. Keith Sturgess. Oxford
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 117-175. 
Maus, Katharine Eisaman. Introduction. Four Revenge Tragedies. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995. ix-xxxi.
Maxwell, J.C. (ed.). Elizabethan and Jacobean Drama: Critical Esssays by Peter Ure. 
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1974. 
McGinn, Donald Joseph. Shakespeare's Influence on the Drama of his Age: Studied in
Hamlet. New York: Octagon Books, 1973. 
McMillin, Scott. "Acting and Violence: The Revenger's Tragedy and Its Departures from
Hamlef\ In Studies in English Literature 24. 1984. 275-291 
Middleton, Thomas and William Rowley. The Changeling. Ed. George Walton Williams.
London: Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd., 1967.
Miller, Jacques-Alain (ed.). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book I: Freud's Papers On 
Technique 1953-1954. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
7?
- - - The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the 
Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954-1955. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988. 
Morris, Brian. "Elizabethan and Jacobean Drama." In Sphere History of Literature Vol. 3:
English Drama to 1710. Ed. Christopher Ricks. London: Sphere Books Ltd., 1988.
55-102.
Morrison, Claudia C. Freud and the Critic. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1968.
Muller, John P and William J. Richardson. Lacan and Language: A Reader's Guide to 
Ecrits. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1982.
Nuttall, A.D. Why Does Tragedy Give Pleasure? Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
Ornstein, Robert. The Moral Vision of Jacobean Tragedy. Madison and Milwaukee: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 1965.
Pontalis, J.B. "On Death-Work in Freud, in the Self, in Culture." In Psychoanalysis,
Creativity, and Literature. Ed. Alan Roland. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1978. 85-95.
Prosser, Eleanor. Hamlet and Revenge. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
1971.
Ragland, Ellie. Essays on the Pleasures of Death. London: Routledge, 1995.
Richards, Angela and Albert Dickson (eds.). New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis: 
Volume 2 of The Penguin Freud Library. Trans. James Strachey. London: Penguin 
Books Ltd., 1991.
Ricoeur, Paul. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1970.
- - - . On Metapsychology: Volume 11 of The Penguin Freud Library. Trans. James 
Strachey . London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1991.
- - - Civilization, Society and Religion: Volume 12 of The Penguin Freud Library. Ir&ns.
James Strachey. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1991. 
- -.Art and Literature: Volume 14 of The Penguin Freud Library. Trans. James Strachey.
London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1990.
Roberts, Patrick. The Psychology of Tragic Drama. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1975.
74
Salgado, Gamini. English Drama: A Critical Introduction. London: Edward Arnold, 1980.
- - - Introduction. Three Jacobean Tragedies. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969. 11-38. 
Salmgar, Leo G. Dramatic Form in Shakespeare and the Jacobeans. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- - -. "The Social Setting." In The New Pelican Guide to English Literature vol.2: The Age 
of Shakespeare. Ed. Boris Ford. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1982. 15-47.
- - - "The Elizabethan Literary Renaissance." In The New Pelican Guide to English
Literature vol. 2. Ed. Boris Ford. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1982. SI- 
116.
- - - "Tourneur and the Tragedy of Revenge." In The Pelican Guide to English Literature,
vol. 2: The Age of Shakespeare. Ed. Boris Ford. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1968. 334-354.
Salkeld, Duncan. Madness and Drama in the Age of Shakespeare. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1993. 
Spencer, Theodore. Death and Elizabethan Tragedy. New York: Pageant Books, Inc.,
1960.
Stone, Lawrence. The Causes of the English Revolution 1529-1642. London and Henley: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972.
Storr, Anthony. Human Aggression. London: Alien Lane The Penguin Press, 1968. 
Sturgess, Keith. Introduction. The Malcontent and Other Plays. By John Marston. Oxford
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. vii-xxv.
Todd, D.K.C. I Am Not Prince Hamlet. London: University of London Press Ltd., 1974. 
Tomlinson, T.B. A Study of Elizabethan and Jacobean Tragedy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1964. 
Tourneur, Cyril. "The Atheist's Tragedy" In Four Revenge Tragedies. Ed. Katharine
Eisaman Maus. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 249-330. 
Trevelyan, G.M. English Social History. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1972. 
Waith, Eugene M. Patterns and Perspectives in English Renaissance Drama. Newark:
University of Delaware Press, 1988. 
Watson, Robert N. "Tragedy" In The Cambridge Companion to English Renaissance
Drama. Eds. A.R. Braunmuller and Michael Hattaway. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990. 301-351.
75
Webster, John. "The White Devil". In Three Jacobean Tragedies. Ed. Gamini Salgado.
London: Penguin Books, 1969. 137-258.
Wheeler, Richard P. (ed.). Creating Elizabethan Tragedy. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1988.
Williams, Linda Ruth. Critical Desire. London: Edward Arnold, 1995. 
Wilshire, Bruce. Role Playing and Identity: The Limits of Theatre as Metaphor. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.
Wilson, Scott. Cultural Materialism: Theory and Practice. Oxford : Blackwell, 1995. 
Wright, Elizabeth. Psychoanalytic Criticism : A Reappraisal. Cambridge: Polity Press,
1998.
76
